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ABSTRACT
The design and operation of a two-sided platform require a variety of decisions to
facilitate a match between sellers (capacity) and buyers (demand). Many platforms
deploy analytic capabilities to leverage rich information, on both demand and capac-
ity, that is available in real-time. This dissertation research explores design decisions,
such as price structure and quality controls, and allied analytic capabilities in order
to document their impact on platform governance. These decisions are tested in the
context of ride-sharing platform by positing three fundamental challenges that must
be accounted for effective design: (1) spatial distribution of capacity and demand that
allows for capacity spillovers, (2) buyer’s sentiment biases, and (3) seller’s relocation
biases. These challenges are assessed in three separate but related essays.
The first essay investigates how the policies for setting surge prices should be
designed under capacity spillovers. Using a data set from Uber’s operations, we
estimate a spatial panel model to reveal its surge pricing structure that accounts for
spatial dependency. Allied counterfactual analysis illustrates the limitations of a spot
pricing policy (i.e., a policy that does not account for spillovers).
vi
The second essay assesses the impact of buyer’s sentiment bias, ranging from opti-
mism to pessimism, on the platform’s decision to control seller quality. Platforms face
a trade-off between ensuring high-quality sellers and guaranteeing enough sellers such
that wait-time is lowered. We formally characterize an optimal exclusion threshold
on seller quality in the presence of sentiment bias. We also examine strategies that a
platform can access to benefit from buyer’s behavioral biases. Results document the
impact of seller quality on a platform’s profitability and social welfare.
In the last essay, we focus on the seller’s relocation behavior. There is a debate
in the literature on whether sellers’ willingness to relocate across demand zones in
order to chase surging prices is rewarded in a ride-sharing platform setting. Using
multiple machine learning algorithms, we classify rewarding behaviors with different
pricing structures under a variety of circumstances. Results provide guidance on how
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Prologue
Advances in information technologies, responsive operations, supply, and distribution
networks have enabled different types of platforms to evolve in various industries.
Such developments require careful and deliberate design of a platform’s operational
and informational capabilities. This dissertation focuses on critical constructs that
ought to be considered during platform design and governance processes. It addresses
the modalities of decisions by three types of entities (i.e., a seller, buyer, and platform
firm) that can improve overall system performance.
A key characteristic of platform firms is that they only exert indirect control on
the buyer choice, supply availability, and sellers’ participation. That is, while match-
ing supply and demand, a platform must design mechanisms that shape autonomous
decisions made by sellers and buyers. A seller may make a participation decision
based on expected profit, which relies on the number of buyers and selling price. Fur-
ther, other complexities arise in the decision-making process related to ride-sharing
platforms, the focus of this dissertation. Since ride-sharing platforms deal with spa-
tial dimensions of demand and supply, sellers not only make participation choices,
but they must also make spatial relocation decisions in real-time. On the other hand,
a buyer’s decision may rely on the expected benefit from the number of sellers, seller
quality, and price. Hence, how buyers perceive seller quality may affect their partici-
pation decision. That is, a buyer’s bias towards a platform’s anticipated performance
can influence the process of matching demand and supply. Furthermore, price struc-
ture and quality controls are essential levers to be designed for platform firm, as
they need to account for both buyers’ and sellers’ decisions. Finally, another critical
1
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characteristic of platform firms is that abundant data are generated from operations
activities. This dissertation takes advantage of the availability of such a large data
set to inform and improve the decisions of platform participants.
The first essay focuses on a platform’s pricing decision. Ride-sharing platforms
employ zone-specific surge pricing to facilitate complex decisions. Since the prices
are spatially dispersed, sellers may spillover (i.e., drivers move around) across zones.
This essay examines whether the spatial price structure accounts for considerations
of sellers’ spatial spillovers. We explore the following questions using a data set from
Uber’s operations: under what conditions are ride-sharing pricing policies effective in
the presence of spillovers? And, what are the implications of such pricing policies for
managing congestion and the welfare of both consumer and labor?
The second essay centers on buyer behavior and its impact on the platform’s
quality control decision. A two-sided platform faces a trade-off between ensuring
high-quality sellers and guaranteeing enough sellers. We investigate the extent to
which a platform excludes the participation of poor quality sellers in the presence of a
buyer’s sentiment bias ranging from optimism to pessimism. We formalize these issues
in an information economics model and examine the following questions: how does
the buyer sentiment affect the optimal exclusion threshold? What is the economic
impact of buyer sentiment on platform performance and social welfare? And, how
can a platform firm leverage the buyer sentiment to improve the firm’s profitability?
The third essay studies the seller relocation behavior. Sellers on a ride-sharing
platform have the freedom to choose where to relocate when they are idle. Some
drivers chase surge prices while the others avoid it. Applying commonly used machine
learning algorithms on the Uber data, we investigate the following questions: under
what condition does surge-chasing guarantee a positive payoff? And what is the most
accurate way to predict a seller’s rewarding behavior?
3
These three essays draw on operations management and information systems re-
search to provide insights on how analytical and empirical approaches are to be used
to understand behavioral and spatial decisions, in order to design in governance prac-




Surge Pricing on a Service Platform under
Spatial Spillovers: Evidence from Uber
1.1 Introduction
The sharing economy has altered the way that firms, service providers, and consumers
manage their time, money, and resources in a variety of industries ranging from trans-
portation to hospitality (Sundararajan, 2016). The use of digital platforms in these
settings enables an on-demand service experience for consumers and expedient feed-
back to service providers. Emergent literature has modeled both the operational
aspects that drive stakeholder (firm, provider, and consumer) decisions and the eco-
nomic ramifications of such decisions (e.g., Cohen et al., 2016; Taylor, 2018; Bai et al.,
2019). Ride-sharing has received particular attention in this realm (Gurvich et al.,
2019; Cachon et al., 2017). Ride-sharing platforms such as Uber, Lyft, Juno, Curb,
Gett, Didi Chuxing, and Fasten connect individuals seeking a ride with providers
(drivers) who provide a service for a predetermined wage payment. In this setting,
drivers are sensitive not only to their wage rates but also to the variation in rider
demand. In a given period of time, the platform influences the ultimate demand and
available drivers it receives by setting prices. And, since drivers are allowed to dic-
tate their own schedule, the platform’s capacity is characterized by the mismatch that
must account for variability both in demand and supply. To deal with this mismatch,
platforms often incorporate dynamic pricing policies such as surge pricing to increase
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capacity and decrease demand in a congested area. Prior research on ride-sharing
has advanced our understanding of surge pricing as a mechanism to help firms that
operate platforms balance capacity and demand. Much of this revenue management
literature is analytic. Specific analytic assumptions have lead to results that feature
competing findings. According to Benjaafar et al. (2018, p.6):
“In settings where workers have discretion over how much they work, there
has been some debate regarding the elasticity of labor supply. For example,
in a study of New Yorker City taxi drivers, Camerer et al. (1997) find ev-
idence of negative elasticity and argue that this may be due to taxi drivers
being income targeters (i.e., drivers tend to stop working once they reach
an income target). In contrast, Chen and Sheldon (2016) and Sheldon
(2016), using data from the ride-sharing service Uber, find that drivers
tend to drive more when earnings are higher (e.g., during price surges).”
The debate about elasticity of labor supply has relied heavily on spot pricing.
There is a gap in the underlying literature, in terms of accounting for labor capac-
ity spillovers and price spillovers that transpire from one ride-sharing service zone
to another. Capacity spillover refers to the movement of drivers from one zone to
another zone, either to fill an existing demand (e.g., to pick up or drop off existing
passengers) or in anticipation of future demand (e.g., to seek riders in surging zones).
Price spillover refers to the smoothing or balancing of prices from a focal zone to its
neighboring zone. Spot pricing, in contrast, refers to the surging of prices solely in
a focal zone. Most of the analytic work, for reasons of tractability, uses spot pricing
and ignores capacity spillovers. We help fill this gap in the empirical revenue manage-
ment literature by incorporating capacity spillovers and price smoothing effects into
6
our model via a spatial econometric specification. In contrast to some research in this
domain, we treat demand as endogenous to price changes, and we model capacity as
a dynamic construct while we investigate a ride-sharing platform’s pricing strategy.
Our study addresses two questions: Under what conditions of price elasticity does
a ride-sharing platform set a particular level of surge pricing to deal with spatial
spillovers so as to provide reliable services (i.e., to reduce congestion expressed by
customer waiting time)? And, how effective are such spillover-based pricing policies
in managing congestion and the welfare of both the consumer and ride-sharing drivers
(labor) in the presence of spillovers?
We start with a stylized capacity management model and find an equilibrium price
that is driven by the current state of both capacity and demand. We then specify a
spatial econometric model that accounts for both the spatial and temporal effects on
price. Using this model, we estimate the pricing decision in the focal zone in terms
of various forms of capacity and pricing in the focal zone and its adjacent zones. We
then use the estimated parameters to conduct a counterfactual analysis in order to
provide guidance in regards to the debate, and to manage congestion, while assessing
consumer and driver (labor) welfare.
Our paper contributes to the emergent literature on platform driven revenue man-
agement in three unique ways: (i) We contribute to the literature on autonomous
capacity management, under two-sided network effects, by showing that depending
upon conditions of price elasticity, a ride-sharing platform can improve upon analytic
(e.g., spot pricing) results in the operations and information systems literature in
terms of managing congestion and welfare of shared capacity systems; (ii) We find
that both capacity spillover and price smoothing across zones have a significant asso-
ciation with surge pricing in the focal zone; this finding advances empirical literature
on revenue management that treats dynamic pricing and congestion management as
7
means to pool, whereas we also consider the case of congestion due to pooling; (iii)
We find that Uber’s algorithms update surge prices much more rapidly than the speed
of sampling of these data by the Uber drivers and consumers; given this observation
and our policy analysis results, we argue that the platform’s rapid pricing updating
enables Uber to achieve high performance, akin to aggressive pricing, when compared
with the spot pricing policies.
1.2 Literature Review
We draw upon two related literature streams: the empirical studies of revenue man-
agement practices and the analytic treatment of allied welfare economics.
Our paper relates to the stream of empirical literature on revenue management
that combines capacity management with pricing strategies. We organize this liter-
ature into the dimensions of either static versus dynamic (i.e., endogenous) capacity
and static versus dynamic (endogenous) demand.
Table 1.1: Empirical Studies on Demand and Capacity Management
Static Demand
(exogenous to price change)
Dynamic Demand
(endogenous to price change)
Static (exogenous) Capacity
Olivares and Cachon (2009)
Li et al. (2016)
Cui and Hu (2019)
Lu et al. (2013)
Li et al. (2014)
Tereyağoğlu et al. (2018)
Dynamic (endogenous) Capacity Moreno and Terwiesch (2015)Karacaoglu et al. (2018) Our paper
The literature on static demand and capacity is abundant. A benchmark paper,
Olivares and Cachon (2009), draws upon a data set from the automotive industry to
estimate the effect of the number and type of local competitors on inventory holdings.
Their results suggest that the service-level effect is strong, nonlinear, and positive in
that automobile dealers carry more inventory (controlling for sales) when they face
additional competition. More recent work in this “static-static” stream focuses on
pricing mechanisms in on-demand service platforms to help balance capacity and de-
mand. Li et al. (2016) use the context of on-demand service platforms to estimate
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the effect of behavioral anomalies between amateur and professional service providers
on market outcomes. They empirically show that professional providers experience
higher occupancy rates and revenues using data from Airbnb. They also propose
a parsimonious model that suggests an incentive for Airbnb’s service platform to
charge different prices to amateur and professional service providers. In a similar
setting using a dataset from Airbnb, Cui and Hu (2019) consider distributed pricing
instead of centralized pricing while studying service provider behavior. Their work
focuses on mutual benefits of social utility for providers and customers. Given the
setup, capacity and price spillovers are not relevant to their work. Moreno and Terwi-
esch (2015) consider dynamic (endogenous) capacity in a two-sided market setting by
matching tasks with service providers. They empirically examine independent con-
tractors’ bidding behavior on freelance contractor platforms, allowing for flexibility
in production and dynamic pricing over time. Karacaoglu et al. (2018) use data from
a large e-hailing company in South America to study reactions of drivers to entry of
new competitors in their zone. Just like our paper, they also find that agents are
likely to scatter owing to increased capacity. However, they do not examine pricing
effects explicitly.
Li et al. (2014) relax the assumption of exogenous demand and instead model
demand as endogenous to price. They use airfare and booking data from the air-travel
industry to conduct a structural estimation of the proportion of strategic consumers
in the population. They identify conditions under which most strategic consumers
are found and when such consumers’ presence may boost revenues. Lu et al. (2013)
develop an econometric framework in a retail context that uses queuing activity along
with point-of-sales (POS) information to estimate the impact of queues on consumer
behavior, showing that a pooled system can lead to fewer customers joining the system
and therefore increase lost sales when customers decide to join a queue based on its
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queue length. As in Li et al. (2014), they also set demand as endogenous to price
and find an indirect cross-elasticity effect, in that lowering the price of one product
can increase congestion, which can indirectly affect demand for another product.
This effect is magnified by the heterogeneity and the negative relationship between
customer waiting and price sensitivity of the customer. Tereyağoğlu et al. (2018)
adopt a dynamic pricing model in a concert ticket sales setting to examine consumer
purchasing behavior that is dependent on price and capacity sold. They empirically
show that the effect of referencing to past experiences is strong and that consumers
are loss averse across price and number of seats sold as a fraction of capacity during
their past visits. These studies consider service capacity as fixed, whereas our model
considers both service capacity and demand as dynamic constructs.
On the analytic side, recent literature in this stream has also examined conges-
tion and welfare implications for pricing and capacity decisions in on-demand service
platforms. A bulk of this literature focuses on spot pricing for reasons of tractability
(i.e., it considers price surges solely in a focal zone). Cachon et al. (2017) and Taylor
(2018) consider agent participation (i.e., the decision of whether to join the platform)
under stochastic demand and agent opportunity costs, and they treat price and wage
as endogenous. Cachon et al. (2017) presents an analytic model with dynamic prices
and wages under self-scheduling capacity (independent agents), while Taylor (2018)
considers platforms that commit to prices and wages in advance; they study the ef-
fect of agent independence and customer-delay sensitivity on the optimal price and
wage. As an exception to spot pricing work, some studies have gone on to examine
information spillovers from consumer learning about the quality of a service from
past experiences (Musalem et al., 2017) or they explore provider capacity when one
service zone spills over to another service zone to meet unfilled demand. Bimpikis
et al. (2019) identify possible spillovers by considering ride-sharing platforms that
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price discriminate based on location to study the network effect of service demand
patterns on the platform’s pricing policy, profits, and consumer surplus under a sta-
tionary environment. However, such models overlook welfare economics. Since the
spot pricing dominates a bulk of the literature on welfare economics, we use spot
pricing as a benchmark for comparisons in our counterfactual analysis discussed in
section 1.5.
1.3 Surge Pricing with Spatial Spillovers
1.3.1 Surge Pricing Model
Drivers in a ride-sharing platform are allowed to autonomously decide whether to
drive in a particular zone, and this autonomy leads to variation in capacity levels over
time. In order to match demand with the variable capacity over time, the platform
conducts a dynamic pricing policy (or a dynamic wage policy) that considers both
the current level of capacity and expected demand. For example, a platform sets
a higher price (and thus a higher wage) when facing lower capacity levels during
a high demand period to increase capacity and decrease unmet demand. In the
Uber platform, this price variation is set by a surge multiplier, a multiplicative factor
offsetting the standard trip fare that is based on distance and time. Throughout this
paper, price denotes the surge multiplier since we focus on the dynamic portion of
price response to capacity and demand in a zone regardless of trip distance and time.
We also assume the driver receives a commission that is proportional to the price.
In addition, the platform deals with spatially distributed capacity since a driver
moves from one zone to another for various reasons. A driver’s participation decision
may be positively (Chen and Sheldon, 2016) or negatively (Camerer et al., 1997)
linked with price. For example, an idle driver may choose to switch zones based on
expectation of earnings in a surging price zone, while an occupied driver may move
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to another zone while navigating to the current rider’s destination. Therefore, capac-
ity levels for the subsequent period depend on capacity spillovers from idle drivers’
movements as well as drivers who relocate to new zones due to rider destinations. In
this section, we formulate how price encapsulates such capacity spillovers. The degree
of spatial price discrimination is determined by how a single zone is defined. As an
extreme, a single zone could possibly aggregate all the drivers so that no actual spa-
tial discrimination exists. However, Bimpikis et al. (2019) argues that some degree of
spatial discrimination is more beneficial than non-discriminated pricing. In addition,
Chen et al. (2015) found that Uber predetermines zones where each driver receives
an identical price. We assume that the entire ride-sharing service area is divided into
multiple zones and that a distinct price is periodically assigned to each zone.
Table 1.2: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
si,t Average surge multiplier in zone i for period t
FCi,t Focal capacity in zone i for period t
NCi,t Neighbor capacity in the neighbors of zone i for period t
UCt Untapped capacity for period t
di,t Aggregate demand in zone i for period t
bji Proportion of ride requests that transit from zone j to zone i
γl Aggregate price sensitivity of capacity type l (l ∈ {FC,NC,UC})
δl Static portion of capacity type l’s participation (l ∈ {FC,NC,UC})
Pl Capacity type l’s participation probability (l ∈ {FC,NC,UC})
α Aggregate price sensitivity of demand
θi,t Exogenous demand states (i.e., levels) in zone i for period t
α/θi,t Price elasticity
p Penalty costs for capacity shortage
h Holding costs for excess capacity
Price in each zone is determined by the price-dependent demand di,t and capacity
levels. Demand di,t is characterized by two factors: a price-dependent factor and
an exogenous demand state. Throughout our study, we assume a linear demand to
capture both factors. Consistent with Uber’s demand estimation approach, we set up
the aggregate demand in zone i at time t to be:
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di,t = −αsi,t + θi,t + error (1.1)
Within this setup, two capacity effects are key factors in determining price: the
direct effect and spillover effect. First, the capacity in the focal zone i for the current
time period t, denoted by FCi,t, has first-order effects on the price. The factors
di,t and FCi,t help characterize the system’s operational performance (e.g., capacity
shortage and utilization), especially for ride demand from consumers sensitive to wait-
time. Once current demand is served by FCi,t, the remaining drivers in the focal zone
decide whether to stay in the zone based on their opportunity costs, which we assume
to be randomly distributed. A driver will stay only if expected earnings exceed
the opportunity costs (Cachon et al., 2017). Therefore, assuming the distribution is
known with its cumulative density function OCFC , the probability of a driver staying
in the same zone PFC is identical to OCFC(Expected Earnings), which is a function
of price under the commission-based wage scheme. Second, capacity spillovers are also
related to price in the focal zone. We characterize two types of price-related capacity
spillovers. One is from the spillover of drivers from neighboring zones and the other is
from untapped drivers − those not currently driving − who choose to operate in the
focal zone because of high expected earnings. Similar to drivers currently in the focal
zone, drivers in neighboring zones at time t, denoted by NCi,t and registered drivers
not currently in operation at time t, denoted by UCt, may choose to participate
in the focal zone with probabilities PNC and PUC , respectively. These probabilities
differ since each of the three capacity types has a distinct distribution of opportunity
costs which take earnings from any other alternatives into account. In short, these
three forms of capacity (i.e., FCi,t, NCi,t, UCt) determine the focal capacity in the
subsequent period with different probabilities that are directly proportional to the
price. Thus, the focal zone capacity is updated by the specified spillovers with price-
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dependent probabilities as well as spillovers that arise due to customer destinations




bji ·min(dj,t, FCj,t) + bii ·min(di,t, FCi,t)
+max(FCi,t − di,t, 0)PFC(si,t) +NCi,tPNC(si,t) + UCtPUC(sit) (1.2)
In Equation (1.2), the first term on the right indicates drivers entering the focal
zone from all other zones, the second term on the right indicates drivers who serve
demand within the focal zone, and the last three terms indicate drivers who choose
to be in the focal zone based on each price-dependent probability (PFC , PNC , PUC).
A summary of all variables is shown in Table 1.2. To characterize the relationship
between price and each of the three capacity types, we assume that the opportunity
costs for each capacity type are uniformly distributed with distinct ranges, so that the
participation probabilities are linearly proportional to the price with different rates.
That is, for l ∈ {FC,NC,UC},
Pl = γlsi,t + δl (1.3)
Consumers in the platform are sensitive to waiting time when they have available
alternatives. In response, a ride-sharing platform may set a price that minimizes
its capacity shortage since the shortage penalizes the platform through a loss of
consumers. Moreover, the platform also needs to consider the number of focal drivers
in the subsequent period. Having excess drivers in the following period may increase
driver competition, which, in turn, reduces drivers’ expected earnings. In sum, a
high price decreases demand for the current period but increases capacity for the
subsequent period. To capture such an temporal trade-off, we model a two-period
14
capacity problem with an equilibrium price set to minimize the penalty costs from
capacity shortage and the holding costs associated with the number of drivers in the
subsequent period. Formally, we present the following stylized objective function for
the platform’s capacity management:
minimize
si,t>1
E[p ·max(0, di,t − FCi,t) + h · FCi,t+1] (1.4)
With the demand given in Equation (1.1), the optimization problem characterizes
an equilibrium price of the platform as a function of each capacity type, when demand
















(see Appendix A for the proof)
As a result, in addition to the zone-specific characteristics such as demand state
and FC, other external effects such as spillovers from NC and UC are also reflected
in the equilibrium price. The equilibrium price is thus based on the current state
capacity and demand as well as the price sensitivities of each capacity type (γFC ,
γNC , γUC) and demand (−α).
1.3.2 Price Sensitivity of Capacity Spillovers
By drawing upon the price sensitivity parameters from the preceding analysis, we
build a set of empirically testable hypotheses on the relationship between the current
spatial distribution of capacity and price. Neoclassical theory assumes that individu-
als maximize their own utility. Such an assumption implies that demand is negatively
related to an increase in price (i.e., α > 0). Negative price sensitivity of demand has
been empirically shown in the context of transport (see Oum et al. (1992)). Further-
more, Cohen et al. (2016) find empirical evidence of the negative price elasticity of
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demand in the ride-sharing context. Nevertheless, a tension remains in regards to the
price sensitivity of labor supply. On one hand, Camerer et al. (1997) finds a negative
relationship between price and labor hours of New York City taxi drivers, suggesting
reference-dependent behavior of drivers. In other words, they argue that drivers tend
to stop driving once they reach their desired daily profits. On the other hand, Chen
et al. (2015) and Chen and Sheldon (2016) show empirical support for a positive link
between price change and driver participation in the Uber platform. These findings
are consistent with a common assumption that expected earning must exceed the
opportunity costs for a ride-share driver’s participation (see e.g., Bai et al. (2019),
Benjaafar et al. (2019), Cachon et al. (2017), Gurvich et al. (2019), Ibrahim (2018),
Taylor (2018), etc.).
Since prior studies featuring price sensitivity and labor supply have addressed
temporal changes, we too look at temporal factors and also focus on the spatial
distribution of drivers in the ride-sharing service area. That is, we are interested in
two decisions of a driver: when to start and stop work and relocation during their
work. The relationship between the price and relocation decision is measured by γFC
and γNC . Therefore, we claim that these two sensitivities will have the same sign (i.e.
γNC
γFC
> 0) as long as a driver exhibits consistent behavior. Particularly, if a driver
has already decided to work in the current period and maximizes expected earnings
for the relocation decision, this driver will move to a zone with a higher price. This
earning-maximizing behavior suggests that both γFC and γNC are positive. On the
other hand, γUC captures both the driver’s relocation and work hours decision. If
the earning-maximizing assumption applies for both decisions, we can conclude that
γUC is positive. However, if a driver’s decision to work a certain number of hours is
independent of the current price, then γUC only measures their relocation decision
and the sign may not be positive. However, if a driver’s decision to work a certain
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number of hours is negatively associated with price, the sign of γUC will be mixed.
Farber (2015) finds that a driver’s hours of operation decision is generally positively
related to price although it is heterogeneous across drivers. In line with their findings,




The sign of the price sensitivity parameters characterizes the relationship between
price and capacity type. First, under a positive γFC assumption, the price in the focal
zone will increase to manage capacity utilization (the consumer-to-driver ratio) when
focal capacity is congested (i.e., the platform attempts to maintain the focal capacity
by providing relatively high expected earnings). Furthermore, if the price sensitivity
of consumers (−α) is negative, the equilibrium price will indicate that the platform
may set a higher price for a low current focal capacity to match demand with the
given capacity by decreasing demand. Second, the current neighbor capacity level is
negatively correlated with price. In other words, price will not increase if an adequate
number of drivers are in neighboring zones but too few drivers are in the focal zone.
Likewise, price will increase when few drivers are in neighbor zones even though
the focal capacity was high enough to meet the current demand. The equilibrium
price also indicates a negative relationship between price in the focal zone and NC
under the assumptions that α > 0 and γNC
γFC
> 0. Finally, we characterize an inverse
relationship between the price and UC. When the number of drivers who are expected
to potentially participate in the following period is high, the price in the focal zone
will increase to reduce the possibility of driver shortage. The equilibrium price also
suggests the negative relationship under α > 0 and γNC
γFC
> 0. Therefore, we present
a set of hypotheses on the relationship between price and each of the three types of
capacity as follows:
Hypothesis 1.1. The price in each zone is negatively associated with the number of
current drivers in the same zone.
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Hypothesis 1.2. The price in each zone is negatively associated with the number of
current drivers in its neighboring zones.
Hypothesis 1.3. The price in each zone is negatively associated with the number of
current untapped drivers.
1.3.3 Price Smoothing
So far, we have assumed that the surge multiplier for a certain zone is independent of
pricing characteristics in other zones. However, there may be a set of absolute spatial
spillover effects on the price across zones. That is, a price change in the focal zone
may directly relate to price changes neighboring zones. In the study of the real estate
market, Can (1992) found that housing prices are dependent on nearby prices solely
based on their spatial proximity. This suggests that there exists a spatial dependency
that translates to neighboring prices. In the ride-sharing context, a pricing policy in
the focal zone may capitalize on the spatial proximity of neighboring zones since it
directly relates to consumer wait-time. In other words, when a focal zone is highly
likely to experience a capacity shortage, the platform may increase prices not only in
the focal zone but also in neighboring zones regardless of their capacity and demand
levels. In this scenario, a driver outside the focal zone travels into the focal zone only
when expected earnings exceed the opportunity costs, which account for the spatial
proximity to the focal zone. Thus, the probability of participating in the focal zone
decreases with distance from that zone. Therefore, when there is a capacity shortage,
the price may not only go up in the congested zone but also gradually rise in neighbor
zones around the congested zone, in order to secure drivers nearby. We define such
a mechanism as price smoothing. Price smoothing can reduce further shortages by
attracting drivers into locations in which their participation probabilities increase.
In addition, price smoothing can prevent high degrees of price discrimination across
zones, which can cause inefficiencies by allowing strategic behavior from drivers and
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riders. In turn, we hypothesize that the surge price in a focal zone also increases
prices in neighboring zones:
Hypothesis 1.4. The price in each zone is positively associated with the prices in
its neighboring zones.
Figure 1·1 offers a conceptual depiction of the hypothesized internal and external
factors that affect price.
Figure 1·1: Conceptual Framework
Notes. wij is a weight of zone j based on spatial proximity between zone i and zone j
1.4 Data and Methods
1.4.1 Data Collection and Measures
We collected data on UberX activity to test our hypotheses using the methods de-
veloped by Chen et al. (2015) and also adopted by Jiang et al. (2018). UberX is
the most popular ride-sharing service in the United States. Although Uber provides
various versions of ride-sharing platforms such as UberBlack and UberPool, we focus
on UberX since it provides a simple one-to-one service and allows for the most auton-
omy for driver participation and spatial relocation among all Uber-based platforms.
We recorded the responses of Uber’s server in the passenger app. When a consumer
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sends a signal for a ride request in the passenger app, Uber’s server responds every
five seconds with the GPS coordinates of the eight nearest available drivers and the
current surge multiplier (i.e., price). We developed a script that sends signals to the
Uber server from multiple observation points simultaneously and records each of the
responses. We collected the data in San Francisco from 00:00 A.M on November 12,
2016 to 11:59 P.M on November 30, 2016. Aggregate descriptions of the sample along
with descriptive statistics are shown in Appendix B.
Our unit of analysis is the surge zone, in which a single price is given for each
vehicle at each point in time. Consistent with Jiang et al. (2018), we use the block
group to denote a surge zone. Although variation within the block group is possible,
the block group is the most granular unit that is amenable to analysis. Hence we
aggregated the collected data into capacity and price levels for block groups. In
addition, based on the data shown in Appendix B, we observe that the average travel
time from one zone to another zone is about 30 minutes. Therefore, we constructed
a panel data set of the average price (si,t) and number of unique drivers (FCi,t) for
each zone (i) in each 30-minute interval (t) - robustness checks are presented in the
Online Appendix.
The other explanatory variables are operationalized from FCi,t with a few as-
sumptions. First, to measure UCt, we assume a large fixed value as the total number
of registered Uber drivers (M) in San Francisco. Thus, we have UCt = M−
∑
i FCi,t.
Second, when calculating NCi,t, we multiply FCi,t by a spatial weight matrix W . For
N zones, the spatial weight matrix is an N×N nonnegative matrix of which elements
(wij) indicate spatial proximity between any two zones (i and j). Its diagonal elements
are zero and the matrix is row-normalized. We adopt the radial distance method (Cliff
and Ord, 1981; Anselin, 1988) for our analysis: wij =





Distij is the distance between i and j. By assembling NCi,t with W , we were able to
incorporate our assumption that opportunity costs increase with distance from the
focal zone. Furthermore, this enables us to use a spatial Durbin model, as discussed
in section 1.4.2.
1.4.2 Estimation Strategy
To begin, we consider a regression model specification with both spatial and temporal
effects of the following form:
yi,t = βxi,t + µi + t+ εi,t (1.6)
where each subscript i refers to the zone and t the time, yi,t represents an observa-
tion of the dependent variable, β is a fixed parameter, xi,t is an observation of each
explanatory variable, µi represents the spatial fixed effect, t represents the vector
for temporal effects that control for the time trend, and εi,t an independently and
identically distributed error term with zero mean. The inclusion of µi and t should
help capture omitted time-invariant factors that characterize each zone and omitted
temporal factors, respectively.
In addition to the spatial and time specific effects, our model further accounts
for the following interaction effects: (i) pricing decisions in a focal zone that may be
influenced by an explanatory variable in nearby zones, (ii) pricing decisions in other
zones that may influence pricing decisions in the focal zone, and (iii) pricing decisions
in different zones that may be spatially correlated due to unobserved characteristics.
To account for such possible interactions among different zones, we develop a spatial














wijυj,t + εi,t (1.8)
where υi,t represents a spatially autocorrelated model and ρ is the spatial autocorre-
lation coefficient.
The inclusion of a spatially lagged dependent variable term (λ
∑N
j=1wijyj,t) and a
spatially lagged explanatory variable (β′
∑N
j=1wijxi,t) account for the spatial interac-
tion effects (i) and (ii), respectively, where λ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient
and β′ is a fixed but unknown parameter. The spatial econometrics literature refers
to the model that includes these two effects as the “spatial Durbin model” (SDM),
see Anselin (1988) and LeSage and Pace (2009). Moreover, specifying the error term
as in equation (1.8) helps us incorporate the third spatial interaction effect (iii). The
literature denotes it as a Manski model, when all three effects are jointly included
(Elhorst, 2010). However, separately identifying each effect is impossible (Bottasso
et al., 2014). Instead, LeSage and Pace (2009) suggest that ignoring the spatial error
dependence only reduces efficiency in the estimates, which can be mitigated with a
large sample such as ours. Moreover, the authors indicate that the SDM model does
not ignore spatial dependence in the disturbances but nests models involving both (i)
and (iii). Therefore, LeSage and Pace (2009) argue that the SDM model generates
unbiased coefficient estimates even if the true process includes interaction effects (iii).
Bottasso et al. (2014) further discuss how unbiased estimates of the SDM model can
be obtained even with the possibility of error dependence.





wijsj,t + β1FCi,t + β2NCi,t + β3UCt + µi + t+ εi,t (1.9)
where s.,t represents the average surge multiplier in zone · for period t, NCi,t =
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∑N
j=1 wijFCj,t, β1 represents the degree that price is dependent on focal capacity at
a given level of demand, and β2 and β3 reflect how much each capacity spillover is
factored into the price. λ indicates the extent to which price is affected by spatial
proximity. We ran joint Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests that were derived by Baltagi
et al. (2003) (i.e., extended LM tests of Breusch and Pagan (1980)) to test for the
random effects and spatial error dependence for our model specification. In addition to
the main explanatory variables, Chen and Sheldon (2016) found evidence of variation
in demand by weather and weekend. Hence, we included t to control for temporal
effects such as Weathert, which is 1 if it is rainy and zero otherwise, which controls
for the natural variation in demand state due to adverse weather conditions. We also
controlled for weekend (Weekendt), and time of day (Hourt) effects, which determine
the demand states θi,t for a given time period; Weekendt is equal to one if the
observation was made during the weekend and zero otherwise. This controls for
variations in demand state by day of the week; Hourt simply controls for time-of-day
effects. Moreover, demand states may also vary with zone. For example, downtown
San Francisco, a densely populated commercial area, has a different demand pattern
from that of the Sunset District, which is a residential area. We control for any such
variations across zones by including the time-invariant spatial effects µi. We ran a
Hausman test to check whether our model estimates are consistent with a random
effects estimation, guided by Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011). The test statistics indicate
that including random effects is inconsistent, thus we consider the fixed effects for
our main analysis. In particular, we use the maximum likelihood spatial fixed effects
estimator proposed by Lee and Yu (2010), who suggest this as a bias correction
procedure for previous maximum likelihood estimators. By adding both temporal
factors t and spatial fixed effects µi, our estimation procedure controls the exogenous
demand state (θi,t) that is presented in the equilibrium price. For the estimation
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process, We follow the xsmle routine for STATA proposed by Belotti et al. (2016).
1.4.3 Estimation Results
The first column of Table 1.3 summarizes the estimation results of Equation (1.9). We
find that the coefficient estimate (β1) for the Focal Capacity (FC) is not statistically
significant. Thus, Hypothesis 1.1 is not supported. In other words, the price does
not appear to incorporate the number of drivers in the focal zone. This is possibly
because the current FC is not independently utilized by itself but integrated with
the demand state as a signal to surge. The price may surge when the demand state
is expected to exceed the current FC. However, the degree of the price surge may
not be dependent on those two factors. Moreover, a driver currently transporting
a consumer may pass through other zones quickly to reach the destination. Thus,
the pricing does not assume that drivers will stay idle within the same zone in the
subsequent time period. Instead, we observe that the median of driver’s idle time
is only about 3 minutes. The positive sign of β1 indicates that price may increase
with higher FC although it is not statistically significant. This could be explained by
driver’s forward-looking behavior. That is, a driver may decide where to go based on
future price rather than current price. To enhance the effectiveness of surge pricing,
Uber can discourage driver’s strategic behavior. By increasing the price slightly with
an additional driver in the focal zone, the focal drivers are encouraged to stay in the
zone.
Hypothesis 1.2 posits that the price in a focal zone will increase if not enough
drivers are close to the zone. We find support for Hypothesis 1.2 by observing that
the number of active drivers in neighboring zones has a significantly negative im-
pact on price. The negative relationship provides two important insights into Uber’s
pricing policy. One is that Uber assumes a positive price sensitivity for Neighboring
Capacity (NC) spillovers. The pricing policy expects neighboring-zone drivers will
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Table 1.3: Relationship between capacity levels and surge multiplier
Surge Multiplier (si,t)
FCi,t 1.22× 10−5 -
(4.99× 10−5) -
FCi,t−1 - 3.23× 10−5
- (5.16× 10−5)
NCi,t −4.96× 10−4** -
(1.03× 10−4) -
NCi,t−1 - −4.52× 10−4**
- (1.08× 10−4)
UCt −1.89× 10−6* -
(7.31× 10−7) -






Notes. Controls include Hourt, Weekendt, and Weathert . Robust standard errors
clustered by zone are in parentheses. Number of observation is 156692 for the main model
and 156520 for the lagged model.
+p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
be stimulated to cross into the focal zone that offers an increased price. The second
insight is that Uber assumes that unmet demand in the focal zone can be served
by the spilled-over NC. That is, the pricing policy proactively capitalizes on the an-
ticipated NC spillovers. We also observe that the magnitude of the NC’s impact is
greater than that of the FC’s. This suggests that Uber attempts to efficiently address
demand in the focal zone by serving relatively less delay-sensitive consumers at a
lower price while giving up on serving consumers who are highly sensitive to delay. In
other words, as long as consumers are tolerable enough to be served by NC, they can
be served at a lower price. On the contrary, if they are highly sensitive to demand,
Uber would choose to serve them with higher price. This aligns with the argument of
Taylor (2018) that consumers with high delay sensitivity have prompted the platform
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to raise prices while giving up on serving price-sensitive consumers.
Furthermore, we find that the impact of Untapped Capacity (UC) on price is
negative, in line with Hypothesis 1.3. In other words, an increase in total number
of registered Uber drivers across all zones is associated with an increase in price.
This illustrates that Uber provides more incentives to currently operating drivers in
any zone than to untapped drivers. An untapped driver may not participate in the
focal zone only because of its high price. Thus, Uber may facilitate the matching of
demand with supply by utilizing existing drivers rather than by attracting untapped
drivers. This finding contrasts with a common argument that the untapped driver’s
participation is motivated by the increased price. Rather, this suggests that working
hours of a driver tend to be set ex ante regardless of price level as assumed in Bimpikis
et al. (2019).





respectively, and the ratios
are sensitive to the value of α. In other words, despite the statistical significance, the
impact of FC and UC on price can be small if consumers are highly sensitive to price.
Nonetheless, to further investigate the effects of FC and UC under specific pricing
policies, we study outcome performance with different values of α in Section 1.5.
We next examine the impact of spatially lagged variable
∑N
j=1wijsj,t to assess
whether Uber accounts for price smoothing. We find that the focal price is strongly
dependent on the prices in the neighboring zones, supporting Hypothesis 1.4. This
indicates that, in addition to exogenous factors such as capacity levels and demand
state, price in the focal zone is endogenously affected by itself due to its interrelation-
ship with prices in the neighbor zones. That is, spatial proximity is another significant
factor that determines the spatial distribution of prices. For example, even when a
price in the focal zone needs to surge based on exogenous factors while prices in
neighboring zones do not, Uber increases prices not only in the focal zone but also
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in neighbor zones. Uber executes price smoothing for two possible reasons. First,
it encourages drivers to move or stay near the shortage zone by simultaneously in-
creasing prices in a cluster of zones. By attracting drivers with high prices, Uber can
aggressively react to a capacity shortage. Second, by invoking price smoothing, Uber
prevents consumers in the focal zone from reneging or moving toward a neighboring
zone. In turn, price smoothing allows consumers to trade-off high price for a certain
level of delay. In sum, we find that Uber manages the spatial dimension of capacity




As per our raw data set, Uber updates its states every 5 seconds. However, as shown
in Appendix B, the average time that drivers require to learn about the system status,
based on their average travel time, is several minutes. We have tested the model by
aggregating the data set at 15 and 60 minute intervals as shown in Online Appendix
Section 1. These results are structurally similar to the base case shown in Table 1.3.
Specification of Spatial Weight Matrix (W):
We use the radial distance method to specify the W matrix while smoothing prices
in our base case (i.e, the result in Table 3). We also checked for the robustness of
our results with different W s. Two other widely-used methods were employed as
suggested in Cliff and Ord (1981) and Anselin (1988): the K-nearest and distance
decay methods. In the K-nearest method, wij =

1, if j ∈ N40(i)
0, otherwise
, where N40(i) is
a set of 40 nearest zones of zone i. In the distance decay method, wij = 1/Distij,
where Distij refers to the distance between i and j. The base case results remain
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robust as shown in Online Appendix Section 2.
Endogeneity:
So far, we have assumed that price decisions for a given period are made after the
level of focal capacity is observed for that period. That is, the focal capacity might
be considered exogenous after controlling for spatial and temporal effects. However,
this assumption may not be warranted for a few reasons. For example, an increase
in focal capacity for a given period might have resulted from a price increase in the
zone for that period. Such simultaneity can bias the coefficient estimates. Although
appropriate instrument variables (IVs) would help us to address the issue, such meth-
ods with a spatial panel dataset are not well developed in the spatial econometrics
literature. Instead, we address the issue in a similar fashion to Bottasso et al. (2014).
First, we obtained estimates using lagged explanatory variables (FCi,t−1, NCi,t−1,
UCt−1) in order to account for the difference in time. In this way, endogeneity bias
from the current price that could trigger changes in the current focal capacity is likely
to be a minor issue. As shown in Table 1.3, column 2, our results are robust in that
NC and UC have a negative impact on price while the impact of FC is insignificant.
Secondly, following by Bottasso et al. (2014), we also implemented temporal lags of
FCi,t and NCi,t as IVs using a generalized method of moments (GMM) approach.
In order for an IV to be valid, it must be correlated with the explanatory variables,
FCi,t and NCi,t in our case, and can influence the dependent variable si,t only through
the explanatory variables. Since driver movements can be costly when the driver is
idle, the total focal capacity might be correlated over time. Chen and Sheldon (2016)
found that the median driving time of Uber drivers was 3.47 hours, which suggests
that the number of drivers are correlated within the time interval. Furthermore, the
number of drivers is expected to have a certain degree of temporal autocorrelation
due to our data aggregation process. However, all lags are not exogenous due to
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the data aggregation. Among those that satisfy the first condition, the furthest lag
could have the least direct impact on the price. Using our data, we find that FCi,t−8
and NCi,t−8 are not significantly correlated with si,t but correlated with FCi,t and
NCi,t. Therefore, we use FCi,t−8 and NCi,t−8 as our IVs for the GMM approach. As
shown in Online Appendix Section 3, empirical results indicate that both price and
capacity spillovers are important factors in the pricing decision, suggesting that we
have mitigated concerns of this type of endogeneity.
Demand Sensitivity:
The coefficients estimated in Table 1.3 imply relationships among price sensitivities
of consumer and labor as suggested in the equilibrium price. We did not have data
on demand state θi,t. Our regression results may be affected by variation in θi,t.
Therefore, we check robustness of the findings by examining the sensitivity of our
results to a range of demand levels. The results are presented in Online Appendix
Section 4. These results show that the findings reported in Section 1.5 are robust to
choice of level of θi,t.
1.5 Counterfactual Analysis
To study the role of spatial surge pricing in addressing congestion and welfare in a
ride-sharing platform, we constructed three alternative pricing policies, each featuring
estimated parameters, and then we compared their respective performance. Recall
that our price elasticity measure is α/θi,t. Since both these parameters can vary
independent of each other, in our simulation, we either fix α (price sensitivity of
demand) or θi,t (level of demand) and vary the other parameter in a systematic
manner.
The first policy (Case 1 ) is a regular spot-surge pricing strategy that disregards
both capacity spillovers and price smoothing: si,t =
θi,t−FC
2α
+ 0.89; that is, price
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changes solely based on the demand states (θi,t) and FCi,t. The other variables
such as NCi,t, UCt, and W do not affect the price decision. This spot pricing ap-
proach is consistent with the analytic literature (Bai et al., 2019; Cachon et al.,
2017; Gurvich et al., 2019). The second policy (Case 2 ) mimics Uber’s existing






j=1 wijsj,t− 0.000496NCi,t− 0.00000189UCt. That is, by using
the estimated coefficients (see Table 1.3), the focal price depends upon NC , UC
and the neighboring zone prices. The third policy (Case 3 ) we propose is a surge






j=1wijsj,t. Since prices become less elastic to a capacity short-
age by considering the anticipated spillovers, Case 3 is the most aggressive pricing
policy for reacting to a capacity shortage. We propose Case 3 and compare it with
the other two cases since it may be a good candidate for a platform like Uber, aimed
to provide reliable services. By comparing these policies, we examine the effects of
price smoothing and capacity spillovers on both driver (labor) and consumer welfare.
As mentioned earlier, a ride-sharing platform’s pricing policy aims not only to
maximize profits but also to increase its market share. To increase its market share,
the platform must provide a sufficient number of drivers to quickly serve consumers
and it must simultaneously provide sufficient expected earnings for drivers. Con-
sumers may be highly sensitive to delay or price because their cost to switch to
another option is relatively low. Therefore, among other factors, utilization ratio
(demand-to-supply ratio) and capacity shortage are critical performance metrics for
the platform. In addition to utilization and capacity shortage, we also compare Uber’s
consumer surplus and driver surplus under the three pricing policies. As the plat-
form utilizes autonomous drivers, the platform’s pricing policy will affect both the
consumer and the driver (labor). Furthermore, the surplus of one side will also af-
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fect participants on both sides. For example, an additional rider who joins due to
high surplus may attract an additional driver by increasing expected earnings. This
two-sided network effect is required for the platform’s sustainable growth (Parker and
Van Alstyne (2005)). In addition, regulators are also interested in these performance
metrics as this industry is growing. In many cities, Uber is now required to limit the
daily hours that drivers can work to protect their welfare. Therefore, it is also useful
to document the surpluses for a variety of pricing policies.
To compare these policies, we set up a virtual space that consists of 25 identical
zones (5×5). In each zone, demands occur randomly based on price, demand state
(θi,t), and exogenous consumer price sensitivity (α). Although the demand state θi,t
should differ across zone and time, we keep it constant (θi,t =100) for the sake of
comparison with α throughout our main analysis. Performance comparisons with
different θi,t are shown in Online Appendix Section 4. FCi,t is initially exogenous
but can change based on the price sensitivity of each capacity inferred from our
estimation. We ran the simulation 100 times with each pricing policy, and calculated
the performance for each run in each of the 25 zones.
1.5.1 Capacity Shortage and Utilization
Figures 1·2 and 1·3 illustrate the operational performance of the three pricing poli-
cies where the demand state is greater than current capacity. Overall, these plots
clearly show the trade-off between effectiveness (i.e., decreasing the average capac-
ity shortage) and efficiency (i.e., increasing the average capacity utilization). Such
trade-offs are commonly seen in the queuing literature (Ou and Wein, 1992), but
they have not been documented in settings mediated by two-sided platforms. Due
to these trade-offs, a platform’s pricing decision depends on the weight assigned to
effectiveness, instead of efficiency. For example, a platform whose goal is to minimize
capacity shortage performs better with Case 3 for consumers while Case 1 is best
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for a platform primarily concerned with utilization. In addition, the pricing decision
also depends on consumer’s price sensitivity. Price sensitivity, along with wait-time
sensitivity form the consumer’s tolerance limit, which determines whether consumer
demand is fulfilled by existing drivers. As the price sensitivity increases, the con-
sumer tolerance limit decreases. The number of available drivers is the lowest in Case
2 when the limit is extremely low (i.e., α > 92); our results are flipped when this
limit increases (i.e., α ≤ 92).
We initially study the impact of price smoothing by comparing Case 1 (spot
pricing) and Case 3. We find that a platform increases its effectiveness (i.e., re-
ducing shortage) by conducting price smoothing. With spot pricing, the shortage
increases with consumer’s price sensitivity up to the point where no drivers are avail-
able. On the other hand, price smoothing induces drivers to capture some of the
highly price-sensitive consumer, and in turn the shortage decreases. This is because
price smoothing effectively incentivizes drivers to gather near the congested zone so
that wait-time in the next period is reduced to within the limits. In turn, more
demand may be served. Secondly, we find that as consumers get more sensitive to
price, Case 3 efficiently maintains low shortage without employing more drivers. As
the price sensitivity increases, price smoothing motivates existing drivers to move
closer to the limits of consumers, and thus utilization increases. However, without
price smoothing, utilization remains nearly stationary but the shortage decreases as
price sensitivity increases, because consumers begin to leave due to lack of available
drivers in their tolerance limits.
We next observe the impact of capacity spillovers in price by comparing Cases
2 and 3. Overall, we find that capturing anticipated capacity spillovers not only
increases utilization (high efficiency) but also increases shortage (low effectiveness).
Case 2 is effective only when consumers are tolerant enough to be served by driver from
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Figure 1·2: Average Capacity Shortage (Less is Better)
another zone. However, when a platform faces a wait-time sensitive consumer, the
demand can be served only by drivers within the tolerance limit, preventing drivers’
chasing behavior. While this increases the drivers’ probability of serving demand, the
total number of matches may decrease due to loss of demand from wait-time sensitive
consumers. In addition, the gap between demand and supply increases with the price
sensitivity of consumers. Consumers could be strategic and choose to wait for a low
price as long as they can afford the wait. However, high price sensitivity restricts
this flexibility as price may not decrease to expected levels and a consumer may be
able to afford a longer wait. Such restricted flexibility makes it less effective to utilize
the expected capacity spillovers. Therefore, a platform that focuses only on reducing
shortage is worse off by incorporating anticipated capacity spillovers.
In summary, in terms of congestion, our results are conditioned upon the price elas-
ticity parameter. We show that (i) price smoothing increases the number of matches
for most consumers by allowing drivers to move toward the congested area, and (ii)
capitalization of anticipated capacity spillovers increases utilization by attempting
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Figure 1·3: Average Utilization (More is Better)
to match demand with near-limit drivers while increasing shortage. To understand
how these effects affect both the consumer and the driver side, we next analyze the
surpluses of both sides in section 1.5.2.
1.5.2 Consumer Surplus and Labor Surplus
With a linear demand assumption (di,t = −α(si,t−1)+θi,t+εi,t), we calculate consumer










+ 1 − si,t) · min(di,t, FCi,t) In our case, the willingness-to-pay
of a consumer changes with her price sensitivity and the current demand state. For
example, in a high demand state such as adverse weather conditions, consumers are
willing to take a service at a higher price. Besides, consumer surplus increases with
served demand and decreases with prices. We also calculate labor surplus (LS) in a




i si,t ·Prob(Serving) ·FCi,t. The
expected earning by a single driver conditional on joining is si,t ·Prob(serving) where
Prob(Serving) is 1 if si,t > 1 and 0.5 otherwise.
Next, we report on how consumer surplus changes with consumer’s price sensitivity
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under three pricing policies. Counterfactual results are shown in Figure 1·4. Our
first observation is that, as consumers become less tolerant to a rise in price (i.e., α
becomes larger), consumer surplus decreases under any pricing. This occurs because
a high α decreases the number of matches. As discussed earlier, consumers with
lower α are more flexible to choose between high price and longer wait. Thus, our
findings indicate that consumers benefit more from dynamic pricing policies with their
flexibility. However, the rate of decrease diminishes. Consumers’ willingness-to-pay is
θi,t
α
+1, which is inversely related with α. Price is also inversely related with α. These
relationships diminish the rate of decrease with α. This suggests that the marginal
effect of adding tolerance is salient for more price-sensitive consumers. Furthermore,
by comparing policies, we find that consumers are worse off with Case 1 than with
the other two policies. Price smoothing enables more consumers to be served by their
strategic behavior such as delaying the ride until price drops. However, with too
high price sensitivity, the difference diminishes. We also observe that the difference
between Case 2 and Case 3 is minimal, which indicates that consumers do not benefit
from efficiency generated by adopting anticipated capacity spillovers. This is intuitive
because consumers benefit from their transactions no matter how many drivers are
nearby, as long as their demand is served.
We next illustrate the amount of labor surplus generated under various pricing
policies. Our results are presented in Figure 1·5. Overall, drivers benefit from surge
pricing policies when consumers have low price sensitivity. Since price inversely re-
lates to α (si,t ∝ α), the expected earnings decrease with α. Despite the negative
impact of individual driver’s expected earning, the total number of drivers in the
focal zone has a positive impact on labor surplus. In fact, the price sensitivities
of participation from NC and UC in the focal zone positively relate with α (i.e.
γNC = −β2 · 2αγFC , γUC = −β3 · 2αγFC and β2, β3 < 0). As α increases, FC in-
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Figure 1·4: Consumer Surplus
creases at an increasing rate at a certain price. This diminishes the decreasing rate
of labor surplus. However, once α exceeds a certain point, price becomes one (i.e.,
no congestion in the zone), which decreases the driver’s probability of serving. This,
in turn, induces a high rate of decrease. The three factors described previously when
combined set up a point of inflection for labor surplus; each pricing policy has a dis-
tinct level of α at which each curve forms its point of inflection. While the point of
inflection under Case 1 is formed when α is about 20, the inflection point appears
when α is about 40 under Cases 2 and 3. The different positions indicate that price
smoothing (
∑N
j=1wijsj,t) dilutes the effects of α on labor surplus. That is, by letting
the focal price depend on neighboring prices, drivers’ benefits become less sensitive
to α. This suggests that, in general, drivers benefit more with less shortage achieved
by price smoothing. Nonetheless, unlike consumers, drivers may benefit from both ef-
fectiveness and efficiency, since driver’s expected earnings may decrease as utilization
decreases. Drivers, counterintuitively, are strictly better off with Case 3 that yields
higher average utilization than Case 2. The gap is more salient when α is greater
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Figure 1·5: Labor Surplus
than the point of inflection. The counterintuitive phenomenon is explained by the
information that price contains. Price is the only information that determines the
probability of drivers acquiring riders without utilization level information. When
price becomes as low as one, it provides no utilization information. Therefore, in
higher alpha ranges that make price become one, the driver’s expected earning reacts
only to shortage but not to utilization as long as demand is present.
To summarize, and building on the conventional literature (i.e., analytical treat-
ment based on spot pricing, termed as Case 1 in our analyses), both price and capacity
spillovers have a direct effect on surpluses. In particular, (i) consumers benefit from
the increase of possible matches achieved via price smoothing and (ii) drivers ben-
efit only from effectiveness, regardless of efficiency, when the information that price
provides is limited.
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1.6 Discussion and Extensions
1.6.1 Spillovers Matter
Ride-sharing platforms manage their pricing policies to orchestrate spatially dis-
tributed capacity in serving demand. In this paper, by addressing the spatial di-
mension, we help fill a gap in empirical revenue management literature where most
studies rely on the competing results from spot pricing and ignore capacity spillovers.
With a spatial econometric specification, we estimate the extent to which spillovers
are associated with price and analyze surpluses under different pricing policies. Our
analyses provide a variety of insights for designing and managing service platforms.
We show that a surge pricing strategy that utilizes price smoothing helps reduce av-
erage capacity shortage compared to a spot surge pricing strategy. Through price
smoothing, platforms can effectively maintain adequate, spatially distributed capac-
ity. Moreover, such high service rates enable the platform to benefit both consumers
(riders) and drivers by increasing the ecosystem in the long-run. In other words,
consumer benefits can spread to ride-share drivers (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005).
In addition to the long-run positive network effect, drivers benefit from the lower
shortage achieved in the short-run, even when drivers have limited access to the uti-
lization information. Our analysis shows that although a strategy that incorporates
the anticipated capacity spillovers (Case 2) generates higher average capacity utiliza-
tion than the strategy without anticipated capacity spillovers (Case 3), drivers fare
better in Case 3. This has important implications for platform designers. By limiting
the provision of utilization information to drivers, a platform can achieve risk-less
growth with a spatial surge pricing strategy.
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1.6.2 Updating Speed Matters
We have shown that the impact of spatial pricing strategies varies with consumer’s
price sensitivity. Ride-sharing platforms digitize all transactions, which helps the
firm to quickly determine demand and capacity. In our data set, Uber adjusts its
price as quickly as 5 seconds based on the data regarding demand and capacity data.
Our counterfactual analysis indicates the impact of high-frequency data in pricing
strategies. Uber currently follows Case 2 as their pricing strategy. Case 3 uses a
more aggressive pricing strategy and always outperforms Case 2 in all price elasticity
conditions (see Figures 1·4 and 1·5). Moreover, it is clear that Case 2’s performance
nears that of Case 3’s performance, and that Cases 2 and 3 outperform Case 1 (spot
pricing). Arguably, an explanation for this closeness between Cases 2 and 3 is that
the algorithm is updating the state variables (e.g., capacity in neighbouring zones)
and customer demand every few seconds. Even though Case 2 is not aggressive
enough, Uber’s algorithm can catch up and come close to the aggressive performance
(i.e., Case 3) well before the drivers and consumers can update their own decision.
Typically, drivers take minutes to update their decision to participate based on Uber’s
algorithm, and this process is an order of magnitude slower than the algorithm. Our
results show key parameters for further tuning the algorithms are α, θ, and the γs.
1.6.3 Limitations and Future Work
Some of the key results are driven by our assumptions. First, we assume that a
driver estimates expected earnings based only on the price information. In practice,
however, each driver also learns from their previous experiences in estimating the
probability of participating. Thus, the results on labor surplus may change with the
driver’s learning about the relationship between pricing and demand. Such learning
could help incorporate efficiency into the long-run labor surplus. Second, we analyze
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performance under the assumption that no alternatives exist for both consumers and
drivers. However, in ride-sharing scenarios where drivers and consumers can easily
switch to another platform, it is important to consider how efficiently a match is made
since efficiency matters in the long-term participation decision of both drivers and
consumers. Although competition among platforms for drivers is beyond the scope
for this paper, future work should consider how competition can best be analyzed
when determining the optimal pricing policy.
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Essay 2
Optimism by Design: Leveraging Quality
Bias vs. Availability Trade-Off through
Platforms
2.1 Introduction
“We will never really understand important economic events unless we
confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature.”
Akerlof and Shiller (2010)
Almost all types of platforms, ranging from AirBnB, Alibaba, eBay to Uber have
mechanisms such as scores and reviews built into their offerings to quantify seller
quality. Given buyers’ interest in securing high service quality, at a reasonable price,
platforms are routinely faced with a dilemma of how to eliminate low-quality sellers.
This dilemma is grounded in a platform’s desire to avoid a “market for lemons”
failure. Excluding low-quality sellers reduces the size of supply-side externalities,
and thereby reduces service availability. Allowing more buyers can spur growth by
ensuring more availability, which harnesses network effects while having possibilities
to increase negative interactions with bad quality sellers. That is, in the presence
of buyer and supplier externalities, the role of a platform is to facilitate interaction
with high quality sellers and buyers. In doing so, a platform must ensure that there
are enough sellers, such that the service time remains at a viable level. In order to
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manage this quality and availability tradeoff, platform firms regulate sellers’ entry
to the platforms or even drop bad quality sellers from the platforms in different
ways (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). For example, the hospitality platform (Airbnb)
checked their sellers’ background to screen out those who have legal issues, and mixed
reality platforms (Microsoft Hololens, Facebook Oculus) require their developers to
demonstrate proven track records. Other platforms have stipulated strict rules for
the seller’s participation through ongoing exclusion. Some platforms for ride-sharing
(Uber, Lyft) deactivate a driver’s account if their rating drops below a commonly
known threshold. A platform firm’s decision on the threshold above which sellers
can access the platform shapes the trade-off between quality versus availability. This
paper develops and analyzes the optimal exclusion threshold, while accounting for
the quality and availability trade-off.
A platform firm must discern how buyers behave, when they are provided supply
information (e.g., availability and price). This platform firm must estimate the effects
of buyer behavior in its decisions. This paper accounts for the impact of the buyer’s
behavior by introducing buyer sentiment bias into the platform’s exclusion thresh-
old decision. We consider buyers’ sentiments ranging from pessimism to optimism,
which forms their prior beliefs on seller quality. Optimistic buyers would believe that
the likelihood of being served by bad quality sellers is low, while pessimistic buyers
would be less confident of receiving products or services at the desired quality level.
We build an analytical model that incorporates sentiment bias into the buyer’s util-
ity. Through model analysis, we characterize the decisions of a profit-maximizing
platform firm which may be interested in attracting buyers, while managing their
service quality expectation. We then analyze how the exclusion decision from wel-
fare perspectives. Policymakers regulate background checks of sellers in peer-to-peer
platforms like Uber and Airbnb, but the platform firms often have stricter rules to
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enhance buyer attraction. Our welfare analysis provides policy implications on how to
screen bad quality sellers. Furthermore, a buyer without adequate public information
about sellers on new entrant platforms may build a prior belief based on the platform
design. For example, when eBay entered the C2C auction market in China, it wasn’t
successful in building buyer’s trust with the platform design despite its success in the
US market (Cusumano et al., 2019). We investigate the situations where buyers may
update their sentiment with the exclusion threshold.
We extend our analysis to examine how a platform firm can leverage the sentiment
bias to enhance its profit. Platforms advertise the sellers’ quality or the effort of
managing quality in order to improve the buyer’s expectation. We assess the impact of
advertising efforts, in the presence of sentiment bias in prior belief, on the platform’s
performance. In addition, some platform firms implement a price discrimination
strategy to segmented markets in order to extract surplus from buyers. For example,
Uber sets a higher price for luxury service with ”Uber Black” than the regular service
”UberX.” We investigate how price discrimination strategy, which accounts for buyer
sentiments, can be effective in two-sided markets.
We contribute to the platform economics literature through the following findings:
1) A platform firm can make more profit with more optimistic buyers. Related
platform design guideline developed in this paper is that profit can be enhanced if
the exclusion threshold accurately accounts for the level of sentiment.
2) We show that a social planner chooses to exclude more sellers for optimistic
buyers and fewer sellers for pessimistic buyers. This result provides a policy design
guidance: social welfare can be maximized with a stabilized threshold that does not
dynamically vary with buyer sentiment.
3) We also find that the exclusion decisions must be selected differently for new
market entrants whose buyers may update the sentiment based on the level of thresh-
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old when compared with the threshold chosen by an incumbent firm. Related design
guidance: owing to limited information about new entrants, the level of the threshold
can signal how much effort the firms make in managing the seller quality.
4) Given the finding that both platform profit and social welfare increase by rais-
ing the sentiment towards optimism, we analyze two design strategies: a) advertising
effort: we show that any type of advertising effort may enhance the willingness-to-pay
of pessimistic buyers as the exclusion strategy can signal a high quality to those buy-
ers; b) price discrimination: when exclusion threshold accounts for buyer sentiment,
a platform firm can extract surplus from segmentation - from either quality-seeking
buyers or price-seeking buyers - through price discrimination strategies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review
the related literature. Section 3 describes our base model of a two-sided platform
maximizing the profit by optimizing the exclusion threshold and price. In Section 4,
we analyze the model in the presence of sentimental bias from both a profit-maximizer
and welfare-maximizer perspective. Advertising and price discrimination strategy for
platform firms are examined in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 discusses the managerial
implications and limitations of our study.
2.2 Literature Review
Our study is related to the literature on two-sided markets that examines a firm’s
decisions in the presence of network externalities (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Parker
and Van Alstyne, 2005). In particular, extant literature on two-sided markets has
focused on the impact of quality control on network performance. This includes
analytical evaluations of levers like exclusion threshold and provision of first-party
contents (Anderson et al., 2014; Hagiu and Spulber, 2013; Huang et al., 2019; Zheng
and Kaiser, 2013). These studies lack considerations of asymmetric quality infor-
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mation and corresponding behavioral biases. There is also a growing literature on
empirical assessment of online rating systems (Gao et al., 2015; Garg and Johari,
2018; Greenwood et al., 2018). Although these empirical studies pay attention to
various behavioral biases such as skewed beliefs and gender bias, they do not examine
the role of platform firms in exploiting behavioral biases in the presence of network
externalities. Our paper is closely related to Johari et al. (2019), who investigate a
platform firm’s decisions on exclusion and information structure in the presence of
information asymmetry. Unlike our formulation, their study does not highlight the
buyer’s perception bias toward the uncertain quality in the platform decisions. Our
paper contributes to the literature by addressing this behavioral gap.
Our paper is related to a steam of research that explores optimism and pessimism
in judgment and decision making. Weinstein (1980) defines optimism bias as the in-
dividual belief that the likelihood of negative incidents happening is higher to others
than to the self. In particular, researchers in psychology have investigated the circum-
stances when people exhibit such a bias. Taylor and Brown (1988) and Weinstein and
Klein (1996) discuss the optimism bias with exaggerated belief in self-enhancement.
Furthermore, Chambers and Windschitl (2004) argue that the manner in which indi-
viduals process information can be another source of bias when people make compar-
ative judgments. In addition, opposite sentiments have also been examined. Dolinski
et al. (1987) find evidence of the pessimism bias as the opposite concept of optimism
bias from their experiments. The biased judgment based on pessimism can also be
explained by an emotional factor. That is, people tend to pessimistically make a
judgment in a way to avoid possible regrets from harmful incidents (Zeelenberg et al.,
1996).
Since sentiments, ranging from optimism to pessimism, may dominate decisions,
they are essential constructs in business studies. Graham et al. (2013) examine how
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manager’s optimism impacts the firm policy, and Long and Nasiry (2015) incorporate
the level of optimism to the inventory manager’s decision-making process. They
regard the optimism bias as a critical factor in the managerial decision-making process
in the absence of network effects. Hagiu and Wright (2015) consider both optimism
and pessimism in the context of multi-sided platforms. They argue that an agent’s
optimism in the expectation regarding the other side’s availability is a necessary
construct in the analysis of a multi-sided market. We take the next step in this
stream by investigating how the sentiment bias in the quality expectation impacts the
platform’s quality-based exclusion decision. In particular, we show that the platform’s
profitability and allied welfare grows with optimism.
Our study also contributes to the studies in the management literature that ex-
amine a firm’s strategies that are aimed at exploiting buyer’s behavioral biases. In
the context of two-sided markets, Rysman (2009) argues that the advertising efforts
must be examined while accounting for behavior because a firm’s choice on one-side
also affects the other side’s decision. A stream of literature on exploitative advertising
strategy has focused on buyer’s loss-aversion. März (2019) investigates the effect of
persuasive advertising that may increase the buyer’s willingness-to-buy. März finds
that a firm can set a higher price through persuasive advertising because it alleviates
buyers’ losses. Furthermore, Karle and Schumacher (2017) find that for loss-averse
buyers, even informative advertising efforts can be persuasive with incomplete infor-
mation. In our paper, we explore investments that may alter buyers’ level of optimism
through platform firm’s advertising efforts on seller’s quality in the presence of the
bias.
A related literature stream has explored how firm’s pricing strategy can take
advantage of buyers’ behavioral biases. We contribute this literature by studying
the efficacy of a platform’s price discrimination with buyer optimism or pessimism
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in the presence of cross-side network effects. Our analysis closely relates to Eliaz
and Spiegler (2008) and Grubb (2009). In their paper, they characterize the optimal
policy for price discrimination with either optimistic or pessimistic buyers in one-sided
markets. In our paper, we examine the price discrimination strategy in the two-sided
market setting in which both buyers and sellers are heterogeneous. The difference
is important because it enables us to characterize the conditions under which price
discrimination on different types of sellers can attract a desirable segment of buyers.
2.3 Model Setup
We present the model development across two sections. First, in this section, we
develop the two-sided market model to analyze platform firm’s exclusion decisions
in the presence of cross-side network effects, without accounting for behavioral bias.
Then, in the next section, we relax the bias assumption. The results from this section
serve as a benchmark for comparing the biased results in the next section. In order
to set up the analysis, we make a set of assumptions that are consistent with the
observed quality exclusion threshold practices at firms such as Uber and Airbnb. The
model accounts for how three parties (buyers, sellers, and the platform firm) make
decisions for their own benefits. Sellers are differentiated by quality (Huang et al.,
2019; Zheng and Kaiser, 2013), and buyers are heterogenous in their intrinsic value
of additional sellers in the platform. A platform firm that connects buyers and sellers
maximizes the profit by setting price p and exclusion threshold k.
2.3.1 Benefits for Buyer and Seller
We extend the formulation in Rochet and Tirole (2003) while setting up buyer’s
benefit. A key assumption here is that the platform without sellers has no value.
This assumption fits observed choices in platform settings such as a ride-sharing
platform. A buyer’s value from joining a platform is derived from two components:
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Table 2.1: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Decision variables
p Price charged to buyer
k Quality exclusion threshold ∈ [0, 1)
Market primitives
q Expected quality from the platform
q Seller quality on the platform
θ Degree of optimism (sentiment) in quality expectation ∈ [0, 1]
β Buyer’s marginal benefit from additional quality (β ≥ 0)
v Buyer’s intrinsic value of an additional seller available
V Maximum value of v
r Percentage commission received from seller ∈ [0, 1]
n(k, p) Number of available sellers for a given k and p
m(k, p) Number of available buyers for a given k and p
N Total number of sellers
M Total number of buyers
λ Threshold for high type sellers ∈ [k, 1]
nl Number of available low-type sellers
nh Number of available high-type sellers
ml Number of available low-type buyers
mh Number of available high-type buyers
c Seller’s fixed cost to join the platform
the number of available sellers (n) and the expected quality from the available sellers
(q). Therefore, A buyer’s net benefit that depends on the number of available sellers
is:
πB(n(k, p), v, q(k), p) = (v + βq(k))n(k, p)− p, (2.1)
where v is the intrinsic value of an additional seller, and β captures how much the
network externalities rely on the expected seller quality. Hence, v + βq(k) can be
interpreted as the total cross-side network effects that each buyer obtains from an
additional seller. The buyer’s expected quality q(k) is an increasing function of the
exclusion threshold k while the number of available seller n(k, p) decreases in k. In
other words, as the platform implements stricter thresholds for seller quality, a buyer
can expect higher quality, but the barrier for seller’s joining also becomes higher. To
this end, our model features the trade-off between seller availability and quality based
on the level of k. A buyer compares the benefit with the current price and decides to
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join the platform if the net benefit is positive. Assuming v is uniformly distributed
over [0, V ], let v∗ be a reference benefit that makes πB(n(k, p), v
∗, q(k), p) = 0. Only
the buyer whose intrinsic value is greater than v∗ will join the platform. Thus, the
total number of joining buyers m(k, p) for given k and p is:






where, M is the total number of buyers.
On the other hand, the net profit of identical sellers who have a constant fixed
cost c to serve on the platform is:
πS(m(k, p), p, r) = m(k, p)p(1− r)− c (2.3)
where p is unit revenue per buyer and r ∈ [0, 1] is the commission rate that the
platform firm collects for every transaction. Similar to Anderson et al. (2014) and
Rochet and Tirole (2003), we assume the sellers who joined the platform for a given
exclusion threshold and price serve all joining buyers m(k, p). There are N potential
sellers in the market, and each seller has its own quality level q that is uniformly
distributed over [0, 1]. Among the sellers, only those who have higher quality than
the exclusion threshold set by the platform are qualified to join. Under the assumption
of identical fixed cost over sellers, as long as their expected net profit is non-negative,
all qualified sellers participate. Formally,
n(k, p) =

NProb.(q > k), if m(k, p)p(1− r)− c > 0
0. if m(k, p)p(1− r)− c ≤ 0
(2.4)
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2.3.2 Platform Firm’s Decision
Buyers and sellers play a simultaneous joining game with p and k determined by the
firm. From this game, there are two Nash equilibria. One is no participation from both
sides. If given p and k did not provide enough profit for a seller to participate, i.e.,
m(k, p)p(1−r)−c ≤ 0, no buyer would have a positive benefit from joining. The other
equilibrium is achieved when a seller can make a profit from buyer’s participation. In
this equilibrium, the platform firm can enjoy profits from the number of matches and
the commission from each transaction. Therefore, for a profit-maximizing platform
firm, the decision problem is given by:
maximize
0≤k<1,p≥0
ΠP = min{m(k, p), n(k, p)}pr;
subject to m(k, p)p(1− r)− c > 0.
(2.5)
The number of matches is determined by the number of joining buyers when
enough sellers are participating. In the case of seller shortage, the number of trans-
actions is determined by the number of sellers. Without loss of generality, we assume
there’s no marginal cost for providing the service, and the zero fixed cost c = 0.
2.3.3 Benchmark Exclusion Threshold
In this section, we analyze the profit-maximizing exclusion threshold while assuming
the buyer expects the mean of seller quality (i.e., q(k) = k+1
2
). The following lemma
characterizes the optimal threshold (k∗BM ) and allied optimal price ( p
∗
BM).
Lemma 2.1. If m(k, 0) > n(k, 0) and p < n(k,p)(m(k,0)−n(k,p))
M
V , the platform faces
seller shortage (m(k, p) > n(k, p)) and the platform firm chooses
k∗BM = 0,








Otherwise (m(k, 0) > n(k, 0) and p ≥ n(k,p)(m(k,p)−n(k,p))
M
V , or m(k, 0) ≤ n(k, 0)),
the platform is with enough sellers and the firm can maximize its profit by setting
k∗BM =





if β ≥ 2V
1
4
N(2V + β) otherwise
. (2.7)
Proof. See Appendix.
Here, m(k, 0) and n(k, 0) indicate the size of the buyer market and seller market
when the price is zero, respectively. These boundary conditions can be interpreted as
market regimes that characterize the size of platform’s market for a given k. There
are two regimes based on the number of potential sellers and buyers in the two-sided
market: normal regime and seller shortage regime. The normal regime describes a
market when there are more potential sellers than buyers for a given k, whereas the
seller shortage regime is a market with more buyers than sellers. Lemma 2.1 indicates
that setting an exclusion threshold is suboptimal at non-zero equilibrium if the price
is not high enough to attract sellers in the seller shortage regime. If the market is in
normal regime or sellers are adequately subsidized to participate in the seller shortage
regime, increasing the expected quality by excluding bad quality sellers is effective in
enhancing the cross-side network effects. Hence, the firm can achieve the maximum
profit with an exclusion threshold.
Lemma 2.1 also characterizes a condition in terms of two sources of the cross-side
network effect (β and V ) in order to ensure a positive exclusion threshold. Setting
an exclusion threshold is optimal if buyer’s benefit is at least twice more sensitive
to the marginal benefit from additional quality than the maximum intrinsic value
of an additional seller. For example, for platforms like eBay on which buyers do
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not want any product from a variety of sellers but want quality products, excluding
bad-quality sellers could amplify buyer attraction. In addition, in the presence of
quality variation, the positive exclusion threshold and the price at equilibrium, and
the corresponding firm profit exhibit interesting behaviors with β and V . Through
comparative statics analysis, we state relevant relationships in Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.1. When it is optimal to set an exclusion threshold (β > 2V ) with
positive V and β,
(1) the exclusion threshold (k∗BM) decreases in the maximum value for the additional
seller (V ) but increases in the value for the additional seller quality (β);
(2) the optimal price (p∗BM) increases in the maximum value for the additional seller
(V ) but increases in the value for the additional seller quality (β);
(3) the number of buyers (m(k∗BM , p
∗
BM)) decreases in the maximum value for the
additional seller (V )but increases in the value for the additional seller quality
(β);




BM)) decreases in the maximum
value for the additional seller (V ) but increases in the value for the additional
seller quality (β).
Proof. See Appendix.
As defined, v+βq is the individual’s cross-side network effect. As long as k∗BM > 0
exists, an increase of V enhances the weight of v on the cross-side network effects for
the increased number of buyers. The increase, in turn, weakens the reliance of buyers’
joining decisions on seller quality. Hence, the optimal threshold k∗BM decreases in
V . Likewise, since the increase of β also increases the weight of seller quality on the
cross-side network effects, k∗BM increases in β. On the other hand, because the buyer’s
willingness-to-pay increases in the cross-side network effects, the optimal price p∗BM
can increase in V and β.
Part (1) and (2) in Proposition 2.1 have implications for platform decisions. When
buyers’ participation is sensitive to seller availability, one would expect the platform
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firms to set a lower threshold. Part (1) reveals that this may not always be the case
in a market where better quality sellers attract more buyers. The exclusion threshold
depends on whether availability or quality is the stronger attractant. On the other
hand, the optimal price increases as the cross-side network effects increase, no matter
what increases the effect. In other words, a platform firm needs to increase the price
to increase the total population of sellers, which can ultimately attract more buyers.
These results are consistent with the results of Parker and Van Alstyne (2005) that
address the effectiveness of subsidizing one side in attracting the other side. Since we
consider a single price that affects both sides in our model, an increase in price can
be regarded as a subsidy given to sellers.
Part (3) and (4) characterize how platform performance changes with each source
of cross-side network effects. When a buyer gets benefit from high quality, excluding
poor quality sellers encourages more buyers to join at equilibrium. This, in turn,
results in an increase in platform profit. On the other hand, when a buyer gets
benefit from an additional seller, one may expect a lower threshold attracts more
buyers. However, from Lemma 2.1, the upper bound of V for a positive threshold is
β
2
. A low threshold due to high V may prevent buyer’s participation with positive
β. With the condition for positive threshold, where β is twice greater than V , the
latter adverse force has a greater impact on the number of buyers at equilibrium. In
turn, the firm profit also decreases in V when β > 2V due to the reduced number
of matches, even though the firm can offer a high subsidy to sellers. Table (2.2)
summarizes Proposition (2.1).
2.4 Buyer’s Sentiment: Optimism and Pessimism
In this section, we consider quality uncertainty, which affects a buyer’s joining de-
cision, while accounting for this buyer’s sentiment. In our model, we assume that
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Table 2.2: Effect of V > 0 and β > 0 on optimal decisions in a
two-sided market











two pieces of information are publicly available: the lowest possible quality and the
highest possible quality. Consistent with the setup in the previous section, we nor-
malize the highest possible supplier quality to 1 and the lowest possible quality to 0
for our analysis. For ease of discussion, we use the terms sentiment and optimism in-
terchangeably, i.e., optimism increases as sentiment goes from k to 1. Thus, under the
exclusion policy, the lowest acceptable quality is equivalent to the exclusion thresh-
old k. We also assume that no information about quality distribution is available
to buyers before they make joining decisions. Under these assumptions, buyers need
to make a joining decision based on their own prior beliefs, which depend on their
level of sentiment ranging from pessimism to optimism. In other words, an optimistic
buyer may expect higher quality (i.e., anchoring toward 1) while a pessimistic buyer
can expect lower quality (i.e., anchoring toward k).
In order to test such biased judgment in buyer’s joining decision, we have con-
ducted controlled experiments using the Amazon Mechanical Turk set up. In the
experiment, we introduced a generic ride-sharing platform to the participants and
asked them to decide whether to join the platform with a specific scenario. The
available information set to the participants includes average price, waiting-time as
a proxy for the number of available drivers, and the quality range. In so doing, we
were able to test the participants’ behaviors in their quality expectations. Details of
the experiment design and results are documented in Appendix D.
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Figure 2·1: Exhibition of various buyer optimism under limited informa-
tion on seller quality
This experiment has yielded two key parameters needed to set up our model. First,
in the participants’ quality evaluation, we find the tendency of anchoring toward either
the lowest possible quality, the highest possible quality, or the mean value of these.
Figure 2·1 shows the tendency. In addition, this salient anchoring effect, a portion of
the quality expectations deviates from the mean value. In light of these experimental
findings, we model the biased quality expectation as a convex combination of 1 and
k in a similar fashion to Long and Nasiry (2015). In so doing, we capture the entire
range of sentiment pertaining to the buyer’s quality expectation.
q(k) = θ + (1− θ)k (2.8)
Here, θ ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as a degree of optimism or sentiment. A pessimistic
buyer’s θ is zero whereas θ = 1 represents an optimistic buyer. If buyers’ quality
expectation was unbiased, θ would be 1
2
and q(k) would be k+1
2
.
In section 4.1, we study the optimal exclusion threshold and allied firm profit in
the presence of buyer optimism or pessimism. In this model setting, when a buyer
anticipates long waiting-time due to lack of drivers, the proportion of optimistic
buyers increases in k. This assumption is consistent with queuing behaviors that
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describe the phenomenon of people expecting higher quality with longer waiting line
(Debo et al., 2011). In our case, a low number of sellers can signal high quality
through the exclusion threshold. To characterize a platform firm’s decision regarding
quality threshold, we will further consider the buyer’s sentiment as a function of k in
an extension for our analysis in section 4.2.
Finally, since the sentiment before making joining decisions only affects the buyer’s
expected utility, the actual utility after joining decision may change with the level
of sentiment. Thus, the decision of a social planner, who considers the benefits for
all three parties (buyer, seller, and platform) may be different from a platform firm’s
decision. In section 4.3, we analyze the optimal exclusion threshold for the social
planner’s perspective, who maximizes the total welfare.
2.4.1 Sentiment-Based Exclusion Threshold kθ
Optimal Exclusion Threshold k∗θ
In this section, we assume that the sentiment is exogenously assigned to a buyer.
Since the buyer’s joining decision relies on the expected seller quality, the choice of
optimal exclusion threshold and price in the equilibrium also vary with the level of
optimism. Proposition 2.2 presents the optimal solutions for the exclusion threshold
k∗θ and price p
∗
θ that account for θ.
Proposition 2.2. If market is in the normal regime (m(k, 0) > n(k, 0) and p ≥
n(k,p)(m(k,p)−n(k,p))
M
V , or m(k, 0) ≤ n(k, 0)), the platform is with enough sellers and the





















Proposition 2.2 indicates that the existence of a threshold depends on the rela-
tionship between the degree of sentiment (θ) and marginal benefit from additional
quality (β). On the one hand, when buyers are not too optimistic, i.e., θ < 2
3
, there
exists a lower bound of β for the positive optimal threshold, which is V
2−3θ . In other
words, if the expected seller quality is a strong attractant to buyers who are not too
optimistic, an exclusion threshold provides a signal for better quality and hence pro-
motes their participation. Furthermore, the lower bound increases in the level of θ.
This is because the increase of optimism level allows a buyer’s ex-ante joining deci-
sion to become less sensitive to the actual quality. On the other hand, if buyers tend
to be too optimistic, i.e., θ > 2
3
, having an exclusion threshold is suboptimal in the
two-sided network as long as there exist positive cross-side network effects through
the network size and expected quality (i.e., V > 0 and β > 0). This suboptimal
result is explained by the fact that no matter how much benefit a buyer gains from
an additional expected quality, limiting low-quality sellers does not attract optimistic
buyers. For an extreme case where buyers expect the highest quality, the platform
can enjoy maximum profit without exclusion.
It is also worthwhile to note that, when k∗θ > 0, the threshold decreases in θ and
V but increases in β (for V > 0 and β > 0)1. The relationship of β and V with
the level of the threshold can be explained with the impact of different attractants
on the buyer’s joining decision, as discussed in Section 2.3.3. Likewise, the degree of
optimism θ is another factor that determines the magnitude of the cross-side network
effect. However, unlike V and β, the increase of θ decreases the impact of k on the
buyer’s expected benefit from joining. In other words, a high level of θ strengthens
the cross-side network effect without changing k. Therefore, the optimal threshold
















Known θ vs. Unknown θ
Despite the importance of θ in a platform firm’s decisions, the degree of sentiment
θ is often private information. Assuming neutral buyers, the platform firm makes
decisions based on the unbiased estimation of the buyer’s expected quality, i.e., θ = 1
2
.
That is, the optimal threshold is k∗BM and the optimal price is p
∗
BM as shown in Lemma
2.1. On the other hand, if the degree of optimism θ is estimated by the platform firm,
the threshold and price can be set at k∗θ and p
∗
θ, respectively. Proposition 2.3 compares
platform profits under those situations, which provides practical implications on the
estimation cost of θ.
Proposition 2.3. When buyers’ expected quality relies on their level of optimism θ,


















θ)− ΠP (k∗BM , p∗BM) increases in |θ − 12 |.
Proof. See Appendix.
An optimistic buyer who is confident about receiving a high quality service or
product from the platform has a higher value from joining than a pessimistic buyer
who may expect the lowest possible quality. Therefore, a buyer’s willingness-to-
pay before joining increases in the degree of optimism. In other words, the more
optimistic buyers are, the more buyers join the platform. Also, more buyers joining
increases a seller’s expected profit, which encourages more sellers to join. In turn,
the platform profit increases in the degree of optimism, regardless of whether the
sentiment information is private or public. Figure 2·2 illustrates key observations
from Proposition 2.3. This figure indicates that it behooves a platform to enhance
buyer optimist through efforts such as advertising campaigns. We further analyze the
conditions under which the advertising effort is effective in Section 5.1.
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Figure 2·2: Comparison of firm profits when θ is known vs. when θ
is unknown
In addition to the direct effects of buyer sentiment on the firm profit, part (2)
and (3) of proposition 3 characterize the efficacy of a platform firm’s information
acquisition. Unlike the sentiment itself, the information about this sentiment does
not have a direct impact on the decisions of buyers and sellers, but this information
has a bearing on the platform firm’s decisions. Given this fact, the firm profit may
be enhanced when the k and p account for the degree of prevalent buyer sentiment.
Especially, as a buyer’s level of sentiment deviates from neutrality (θ = 1
2
), the benefit
of knowing θ increases. If a platform firm knows that buyers are pessimistic, the firm
may encourage the buyers whose quality expectations are near the lowest to join by
setting a higher threshold. However, when the information of θ is private to buyers,
the platform firm may lose pessimistic buyers because k∗BM makes their expected
quality too low to join. On the other hand, k∗BM for optimistic buyers is too high to
maintain enough sellers that attract buyers. Therefore, the platform with k∗θ and p
∗
θ
can capture higher profit than platform with k∗BM and p
∗
BM . As long as acquisition




Thus far, we have examined a platform firm’s decisions to select an exclusion threshold
and to select pricing in ordet to maximize platform profit. In this section, we extend
our model to examine the exclusion decision, by assuming that this decision is made
by a social planner who is concerned with the maximization of social welfare. While
doing so, we also assess the impact of ex-ante sentiment on the buyers’ and sellers’
surpluses. That is, we calculate the social welfare by summing up buyers’ profit,
sellers’ profits, and the platform profit. Figure 2·3 describes how each of realized
profit changes with the level of buyers’ sentiment. The formulation of surplus analysis
and its implications are described below.
Figure 2·3: Surpluses with k∗θ and p∗θ
Once joined, a buyer’s actual surplus πB is the benefit gained from the average
seller quality. As explained in Section 3.1, only buyers whose intrinsic value (v) is
greater than v∗ join the platform. For buyers whose v are uniformly distributed over
2We estimate θ through our behavioral experiment as shown in the appendix. Through the use of
mechanisms such as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, we illustrate that this estimation can be achieved
at a very low cost. Hence, in our further analysis, we assume the acquisition costs to be negligible.
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Figure 2·4: Profit-maximizing vs.welfare-maximizing










)N(1− k)− p dv. (2.10)
For a pessimistic buyer (θ < 1
2
) who joins with a low expectation in seller quality,
there is no surplus loss after realizing the actual seller quality. In other words, a
pessimistic buyer has lower ex-ante willingness-to-pay than ex-post willingness-to-
pay because the realized value of average quality is greater than the expected quality.
Those buyers who decide to join with low willingness-to-pay could obtain surpluses
from higher quality than expected. In contrast, an optimistic buyer (θ > 1
2
) starts
with high willingness-to-pay owing to high quality expectation. Once the quality
is realized to be lower than the expectation, the joined buyer may face a negative
surplus.
Unlike buyers, a seller’s benefit monotonically increases in the level of buyer sen-
timent. The more buyers join due to optimism, the higher profits a seller can obtain.
Because all sellers are assumed to be identical in their joining costs, the total sellers’
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V + β(θ + (1− θ)k)− p
N(1−k)
V
p(1− r) dq. (2.11)
As discussed in Section 4.1, the platform firm’s profit ΠP increases in the level of
buyer sentiment, since it relies on the number of matches. Likewise, the total sellers’
benefits are sensitive to the number of buyers the sellers can serve on the platform.
The platform firm extracts sellers’ benefits only through commission r, which we set
as a fixed rate. Therefore, the critical factor that the social planner concerns would
be the balance between the firm profit and the buyers’ benefit through the exclusion
threshold and price. Proposition 2.4 characterizes the welfare-maximizing exclusion
threshold for different levels of buyer sentiment.
Proposition 2.4. (1) When buyers are pessimistic (θ ≤ 1
2
), the profit-maximizing
threshold is higher than the welfare-maximizing threshold if M > (1−2θ)V
2(1−θ) holds.
(2) When buyers are optimistic (θ ≥ 1
2
), the welfare-maximizing threshold is higher
than the profit-maximizing threshold.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 2·4 illustrates Proposition 2.4. As discussed, the k∗θ maximizes the firm’s
profit by increasing the number of joining buyers in the normal regime. For pes-
simistic buyers, a high threshold attracts more buyers so the firm’s profit can be
maximized. However, when the buyer’s market size is big enough (i.e., M > (1−2θ)V
2(1−θ) ),
the benefits of pessimistic buyers who join the platform can be reduced with the
high k∗θ . This is because buyers’ surplus increases with cross-side network effects. In
other words, buyers can gain benefit from the welfare-maximizing k∗SW which yields a
greater number of available sellers n than k∗θ . That is, as long as the buyers’ market
size guarantees a positive seller’s profit, the social planner may find it optimal to
secure more sellers to benefit more buyers on the platform.
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For optimistic buyers, low k secures more sellers, which in turn attract more
buyers. However, when optimistic buyers realize the actual seller quality, their ex-
post surplus may be negative. In other words, the level of quality that the buyers
receive makes the willingness-to-pay less than the profit-maximizing price. When
considering this ex-post consumer surplus, the welfare-maximizing k∗SW must be less
than the profit-maximizing k∗θ .
In summary, k∗SW balances two sources of buyers’ cross-side network effects (i.e.,
seller quality and availability) while accounting for buyers’ sentiments. It allows
pessimistic buyers to have more benefits from more availability and optimistic buyers
to have more benefits from better quality. Therefore, k∗SW becomes less sensitive to θ
than k∗θ as shown in Figure 2·4. This result provides a policy implication regarding
how to regulate platform firms in their seller screening process. While a firm may
find it profitable to set a dynamic threshold that responds to the buyer sentiment, a
stabilized threshold that accounts for full range of sentiment will yield higher social
welfare.
2.4.3 Updated Sentiment based on Threshold k
In this section, we consider a situation where a buyer updates the sentiment θ based
on the given information. Drawing upon behavioral queuing theory, we assume that
uninformed buyers may expect higher quality when they perceive a longer waiting
time (Debo et al. 2012). In the case when a platform firm can limit low-quality
sellers’ joining, the threshold also provides information regarding the expected seller
quality. Our experimental results indicate that θ increases in k when buyers expe-
rience a limited number of drivers. To be consistent with these results, we assume
buyers become more optimistic in their quality expectation with a higher k, when the
platform is with a limited number of sellers. That is, while relaxing our previous as-
sumption of exogenously assigned θ, we analyze the impact of endogenous sentiment
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on a platform firm’s decisions. We assume that buyers initially have prior sentiments
and then update based on the level of exclusion threshold. To capture such updating
heuristic, we model the updated sentiment as θ′ = ak + θ with a ∈ [0, amax], where θ
is the initially assigned sentiment on which a buyer anchors. amax is the upper bound
of a that makes θ′ = 1.
The relationship between a buyer’s sentiment and an exclusion threshold impacts
the trade-off caused by the threshold. In our benchmark analysis under the assump-
tion of exogenous sentiment, presented in Section 3, a higher threshold allows a buyer
to expect a higher quality through a signal that the lowest possible quality also in-
creases with the threshold. As the buyer’s sentiment are updated with the level of
threshold, the high threshold makes the buyer more optimistic. The expectation re-
garding quality level is at a higher level with the updated sentiment when compared
with the exogenous sentiment. However, an increase of expected quality, threshold
decreases the seller availability. Owing to this quality- availability trade-off, a plat-
form firm needs to balance its threshold decision with respect to changes of buyers
and sellers. Proposition 2.5 compares the optimal exclusion thresholds k∗θ′ with up-
dated sentiment θ′ and the optimal threshold threshold k∗θ with exogenous sentiment
θ.
Proposition 2.5. When buyers update their level of optimism based on k with a
limited number of sellers,
(1) k∗θ′ is less than or equal to k
∗
θ if 0 ≤ θ ≤
4β−5V
9β
for β > 5V
4
,





< θ ≤ 2β−V
3β
for β > 5V
4





< β < 5V
4
,
(3) m(k∗θ′ , p
∗






In a market where buyers update the initial sentiment, a mixed strategy has merit.
In other words, a platform firm may find it profitable to adjust the threshold either
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to higher or lower value than k∗θ based on the initial sentiment in the market. When
buyers are initially pessimistic (i.e., θ ≤ 4β−5V
9β
), a lower k attracts more updating
buyers as long as the cross-side network effects are highly driven by the expected seller
quality (i.e., β > 5V
4
). One can expect that a pessimistic buyer is better off with high
k because pessimism (i.e., low θ) has more room to turn to the maximum optimism
(i.e., θ = 1). For a fixed a ∈ [0, amax], the pessimistic buyer’s updated θ′ increases even
with low k. Furthermore, for pessimistic buyers, the effectiveness of increasing the
sentiment is less than the effectiveness of guaranteeing more availability. Therefore,
as long as a platform firm finds a positive k∗θ profitable for a given θ, the value of θ
′
will be greater than θ so the buyers can enjoy more availability with lower k. This
lowering in the value of optimal threshold is attributed to joining decisions made by
new entrants with lack of brand recognition and reputation, (e.g., Uber’s decision
to control for quality in 2014)3. Our results also imply that, in a two-sided market
where buyers care about seller quality, such that a positive threshold is optimal for
any non-pessimistic buyers, a new entrant platform firm without enough sellers may
set a lower threshold than established platform firms with many sellers.
On the other hand, an increase of sentiment is effective in securing more buyers
when buyers are moderately optimistic (i.e., 4β−5V
9β
< θ ≤ 2β−V
3β
) in such quality-driven
market, with β > 5V
4
. In this setting, a higher k than k∗θ is optimal to account for the
updated sentiment if a buyer initially is initially optimistic about seller quality. This
higher threshold explains the quality policies of established companies embarking
on a platform competition, when they are endowed with brand recognition. Such
firms cater for buyers who are moderately optimistic in their quality perception (e.g.,
Microsoft’s entering the mixed reality device market with its Hololens platform).4
3In 2014, Uber internally announced how they control the driver quality. Before 2014, the quality
control effort was not a part of the platform’s decisions. (https://www.businessinsider.com/leaked-
charts-show-how-ubers-driver-rating-system-works-2015-2)
4Hololens requires third-party application developers to have proven track records in AR and VR
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For markets where the cross-side network effects are moderately affected by quality
(i.e., V
2
< β ≤ 5V
4
), a platform firm is better off with a higher threshold as long as
buyers are initially pessimistic or not too optimistic (i.e., 0 ≤ θ ≤ 2β−V
3β
). Similar
to the results from Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 2.2, if buyers very optimistic
(θ > 2β−V
3β
), accepting all sellers without a threshold would be optimal. However, in
the markets with V
2
< β ≤ 5V
4
, a positive threshold works only for the pessimistic
buyers (i.e., 0 ≤ θ < 2
5
). The pessimistic buyers who would not join the platform with
k∗θ due to the low expected quality find it attractive to join with a higher threshold.
Figure 2·5 depicts the different exclusion threshold strategies based on the buyer’s
initial sentiment for the highly quality-based market. The solid line illustrates the
optimal threshold of firms with buyers whose sentiments are constant while the dashed
line reports the optimal threshold for buyers with updated sentiments.
Figure 2·5: Optimal Exclusion threshold
Proposition 2.5 part (3) compares the number of joining buyers with updated
sentiment with the number of joining buyers who do not update the sentiment. If a
buyer’s sentiment θ increases in k, k∗θ′ attracts more buyers than the number of joining
when they join. (https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/hololens/partner-program)
66
Figure 2·6: Platform profit
buyers without updating with k∗θ . This is because the buyer’s updating behavior
allows the market to consist of more optimistic buyers. In addition, we numerically
compare the allied firm profits and the results are shown in Figure 2·6. A platform
firm is better off with buyers who update their sentiment, ceteris paribus. This result
suggests that entrants with a limited number of sellers may be able to outperform
incumbents with the same number of sellers by accounting for the buyer’s ability
to adjust their sentiment. Although the number of sellers is public information, a
buyer’s perception of quality may be different across entrants and incumbents. Since
there is a lower amount of public information about seller quality (such as reviews
or ratings) for a new platform entrant than incumbents, prior sentiment on entrants
may be more readily updated through the entrant firm’s quality control effort.
2.5 Strategies to Manage Sentiment Bias
In two-sided markets, platform firms make efforts to secure the participation of both
sellers and buyers under quality uncertainty. One strategy to enhance such partic-
ipation is advertising efforts, which both inform pessimistic buyers about the true
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average seller quality and promote the seller quality to make buyers more optimistic.
Through such effort, a platform firm can expect more participation of buyers, along
with strengthening of the cross-side network effect. Another strategy is price dis-
crimination by segmenting the seller market base, while accounting for on sentiment
based biases. For example, Uber platform provides different services like UberX and
UberBlack, which are segmented based on the service quality, for different prices. In
this section, we analyze the efficacy of these two strategies to attract both sellers and
buyers while leveraging buyer behavior in expecting seller quality.
2.5.1 Advertising Investment
Proposition 2.3 suggests that the platform can obtain higher profits by making buyers
optimistic about the seller quality. To this end, platform firms attempt to alter the
level of buyer sentiment, towards increased optimism, by advertising the seller quality.
Such effort incurs advertising costs. Extending Vidale and Wolfe (1957), we assume
that normalized advertising effort (e ∈ [0, 1]) has a positive impact on the portion of
pessimism in the sentiment: θ(e) = (1−θ)e+θ, where θ is an initial level of sentiment
without any advertising effort. When e is at maximum level, θ reaches its maximum
level. We also consider a convex increasing cost for the advertisement given Ae2,
where A is the advertising cost per unit effort squared (Thompson and Teng, 1984).
Then platform profit function, defined previously in Lemma 2.1, is restated as:
ΠP = m(k, p)pr − Ae2. (2.12)
Given this profit function, optimal exclusion threshold k∗e and price p
∗
e are functions
of the advertising effort e. This optimization analysis is discussed next. This analysis
also served as a robustness check on our earlier results on the relationship between
the exclusion threshold and buyer sentiment in the presence of advertising effort.
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Figure 2·7: Platform profit with advertising efforts at low cost A
Figure 2·8: Platform profit with advertising efforts at high cost A
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9βθ−9β−9βeθ+9βe as long as k
∗
e is positive.
5 The optimal solutions indicate that both
θ and e determine whether a threshold k∗e should be set. A platform firm may find
it optimal to set such a quality threshold when buyers are pessimistic, whereas no
exclusion makes more sense with high θ. Furthermore, we find that k∗e decreases in e.
6
An advertising effort allows more buyers to join without limiting the seller’s joining.
With a low value of A, a platform firm can invest at a maximum level to make buyers
optimistic. However, if the value of A is high, an increase of θ through e may not be
effective in increasing the firm profit. Figures 2·7 and 2·8 illustrate this relationship.
We denote the twin reference points that determine the minimum levels of adver-
tising cost per unit effort squared by Â0 for k
∗
e = 0 and Âk for k
∗
e > 0. Proposition
2.6 identifies the conditions under which an interior solution e∗ exists.






(1) When A ≥ Â0 for k∗e = 0 or A ≥ Âk for k∗e > 0, there exists an unique optimal
level of e∗ that maximizes the platform profit.
(2) Otherwise, the maximum level of advertisement maximizes the platform profit.
Proof. See Appendix.
When buyers are initially optimistic about joining without an exclusion policy in
the absence of advertising, the effect of e on the firm profit is relatively low, owing
to the added advertisement cost. This intuition may inform a platform firm’s choice,
such that it can be profitable by investing less than the maximum level of advertising
for highly optimistic buyers. However, Â0 increases in θ. When having no exclusion
is the optimal policy for a platform firm, a very high value of Â0 implies that it is
more likely that the maximum level of e is optimal. That is, the maximum level of





3β(e−1)2(1−θ0) . This value is negative for V > 0, β > 0,
0 ≤ e < 1, and 0 ≤ θ0 < 1.
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e still can be effective for making profits when buyers are initially optimistic enough.
This is because k∗e not only depends on θ but also on e. In a setting where a high
e reduces the maximum reference value of θ that suggest no exclusion, the impact
of e on the cross-side network effect for the buyers is still high enough to make the
platform firm profitable.
Likewise, firms with a positive exclusion threshold may also find it to be profitable
with the maximum level of e, when they are endowed with a very high value of Âk.
However, unlike Â0, Âk decreases in θ as far as a positive k
∗
e is ensured by a given
θ and β. Due to the relationship between e and the maximum reference value of θ
for a positive k∗e , a firm can find it optimum to set near maximum level of e with a
positive k∗e for pessimistic buyers.
In summary, a platform firm can be profitable by investing in high levels of ad-
vertising effort in two-side markets if this firm determines the exclusion threshold in
a way to account for buyer sentiments at any level. That is, with a high level of e,
no exclusion may be profitable to firms with optimistic buyers while excluding low
quality sellers is optimal with pessimistic buyers.
2.5.2 Price Discrimination
Price discrimination based on the quality heterogeneity in seller type is an alternative
strategy to enhance buyer participation. For example, in 2018, Airbnb introduced
“Airbnb Plus” to promote high quality hosts. While a platform guarantees buyers a
high quality from the distinct listings it generate, it charges an additional fee to higher
quality sellers, and in turn increases the price charged to buyers.7 Another example is
“UberBlack” on the Uber platform, which includes professional drivers with high-end
black cars. Through UberBlack, the platform guarantees higher quality for a higher
7https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/2195/airbnb-plus-program-terms-and-conditions
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price than the regular service, UberX.8 In this section, we analyze the efficacy of price
discrimination, in the presence of the entire range of buyer sentiment, in a two-sided
market.
We divide the population of sellers into two types: high type seller (qh ∈ [λ, 1])
and low type seller (ql ∈ [k, λ)). We assume that (i) the exclusion threshold k and the
type separation point λ are public information, and (ii) a buyer’s willingness-to-pay
is higher for high type sellers than low type sellers. That is, the price of a high type
seller is often greater than the low type for similar trips (in terms of start point,
destination and surge prices). We model this price discrimination as a multiplier
x > 1 over the price of the low type seller for a similar trip. A buyer’s decision in
this case is characterized as three segments of choice, which label as buyer segments:
• Join the high type sellers for a high price (quality-seeking buyer),
• Join the low type for a low price (price-seeking buyer),
• Do not join either type of seller.
In particular, for buyers whose intrinsic values are uniformly distributed over [0, V ],
there are three critical points of intrinsic value that determine buyer segments: vL,
vH , along with a value threshold v′, defined below. Buyers whose v is greater than
vL join the platform for the low type sellers, and those with v that is greater than
vH join for the high type sellers. That is, the benefit of a buyer with vL (vH) from
joining the low (high) type sellers is zero. In turn, vL = −βθλ + β(θ − 1)k − p
kN−λN
and vH = βθ(λ−1)−βλ+ px
N−λN . Therefore, the total number of buyers who can join
for either type of sellers is M(1− max(v
L,vH)
V





When a buyer’s v is greater than both vH and vL in the range of [0, V ], the
buyer can become either quality-seeking or price-seeking and choose one based on
8https://www.ridester.com/uberx-vs-uberblack/
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their benefits. If the benefit is greater from high type than from low type, the buyer














where nl and nh denote the number of available sellers in low type and high type
respectively. Buyers with v > v′ are quality-seeking for nh > nl, whereas those
buyers become price-seeking when nh < nl. With this setup, we analyze the buyers’
joining decisions and the corresponding platform profits in a special case (without
loss of generality), where two thirds of available sellers are high type (i.e., λ = 1+2k
3
)
or low type (i.e., λ = 2+k
3
). Proposition 2.7 documents the characteristics of buyer
segmentation in this special case.
Proposition 2.7. For x > 1,
(1) When λ = 1+2k
3
(i.e., nh > nl), no price-seeking buyers join but only quality-
seeking buyers join regardless of the value of k∗θ .
(2) When λ = 2+k
3
(i.e., nl > nh), no quality-seeking buyers join but only price-
seeking buyers join regardless of the value of k∗θ .
Proof. See Appendix.
As discussed in section 2.4.1, the existence of k∗θ depends on the level of buyer
sentiment. A positive exclusion threshold induces the cross-side network effects for
pessimistic buyers whereas securing all sellers enhances the network effects for opti-
mistic buyers. However, price discrimination changes the dynamics of the cross-side
network effects through the separation point λ. When buyers are optimistic, the ex-
pected quality for low type sellers is near the separation point. As λ decreases, the
value of expected quality is not adequate to attract optimistic buyers. Thus, opti-
mistic buyers do not become price-seeking in spite of enough available sellers without
exclusion. On the other hand, while excluding low-quality sellers may increase a pes-
simistic buyer’s expected quality, the entire cross-side network effect for the buyers
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may decrease because of the reduction of availability as λ decreases. Instead, the
benefits of both pessimistic and optimistic buyers from joining for high type sellers
are enough to pay a higher price than p∗θ. Therefore, in a market dominated by high
type sellers (i.e., low λ), most buyers tend to become quality seeking due to the weak
cross-side network effect for price-seeking buyers.
In contrast, when a market is saturated by low type sellers (i.e, high λ), buyers
are better off with joining for low type sellers. That is, optimistic buyers without
exclusion can gain enough benefit from more availability of low type sellers while a
positive k∗θ provides pessimistic buyers enough benefits to join for the low type sellers
through increased expected quality. Hence, in the presence of sentiment bias, whether
most sellers are low type or high type is a critical determinant for buyers to choose
price-seeking or quality seeking.
Our results indicate that the price discrimination strategy may not be effective
to attract buyers from both segments in two-sided markets where a buyer’s joining
decision relies on the availability and the expected quality. The ineffectiveness is
derived by the sentiment bias because the bias causes the buyer’s misperception of
discriminated prices for the exclusive services. In other words, without the bias the
price discrimination may allow the segmented buyers to obtain benefits from differ-
ent types of sellers. To characterize conditions for an effective price discrimination
strategy with choices of λ and x in the presence of sentiment bias, we analyze the
allied firm’s profits. Corollary 2.1 states the allied firm’s profit functions and Figures
2·9, 2·10, 2·11, 2·12 present the numerical evaluation of the profit for different values
of x.
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Corollary 2.1. (1) When λ = 1+2k
3






θ ≥ 0 and vH < V ,
−MNrx(βθ+V )(3V (3x−4)+β(θ(9x−8)−4))
24V
if k∗θ = 0 and v
H < V ,
0 otherwise.
(2.13)
(2) When λ = 2+k
3







θ ≥ 0 and vL < V ,
MNr(3V−βθ)(βθ+V )
24V
if k∗θ = 0 and v




Figure 2·9: Platform profit under segmentation for x = 1.0
When a market is saturated by low type sellers (i.e., nH < nL), the profit decreases
in θ. Through segmentation, a platform firm may lose optimistic buyers who would
join for n(k∗θ , p
∗
θ) and a high q(k
∗
θ) since those buyers may face lower availability nl and
lower expected quality λ. This result still holds when there is no price discrimination.
On the other hand, a firm’s profit increases in the level of buyer sentiment θ for which
k∗θ is positive regardless of the value of x in a market dominated by high type sellers
(i.e., nH > nL). Similar to a platform without segmentation, quality-seeking buyers
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Figure 2·10: Platform profit under segmentation for x = 1.25
Figure 2·11: Platform profit under segmentation for x = 1.5
Figure 2·12: Platform profit under segmentation for x = 1.75
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in such a market may get benefit from high expected quality with a positive k∗θ .
However, as x increases, the relationship between the profit and θ becomes negative
when buyers are optimistic enough for k∗θ = 0. This is because p
∗
θ increases in θ and
quality-seeking buyers need to pay higher price as θ increases. Furthermore, once x
exceeds a certain value, a firm with nH < nL outperforms other firms with nH > nL.
Our results have implications for a platform firm’s decision in the presence of
buyer sentiment. A platform firm may find the segmentation profitable with a low x
for both pessimistic and optimistic buyers when λ is so low that high type sellers are
the majority in the seller market. With a high λ, a firm’s profit may be insensitive to
the value of x. Although we analyze the price discrimination under the assumption
of exogenous λ, it may be another critical decision by the firm in many cases. In
such cases, a firm may be profitable by setting a high λ with a high x for pessimistic
buyers or a low λ with a low x for optimistic buyers.
2.5.3 Comparative Assessment
Table 2.3 compares a platform firm’s implementation choices around the strategies
developed in the previous two sections. We summarize the effects of four variables
on these strategies, if the sentiment is either optimistic or pessimistic: the threshold
for low type seller k, the threshold for high type sellers λ, advertisement effort e, and
price discrimination as a multiplier x. For optimistic buyers, a firm can benefit from
investing as long as no exclusion policy follows. On the other hand, the maximum
advertising with the exclusion policy would be optimum for pessimistic buyers. Anal-
ogous to the advertising strategy, a price discrimination strategy must be carefully
designed with an appropriate exclusion decision. As long as the exclusion threshold
accurately accounts for the buyer sentiment, having more high type sellers who are
highly priced outperforms for both optimistic and pessimistic buyers if the level of
price discrimination is low. However, as the level of price discrimination increases,
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the market saturated by low type sellers may be advantageous to pessimistic buyers.
Table 2.3: Firm decisions for each strategy
Buyer’s (initial) sentiment Advertisement Price discrimination
Optimistic k ↓ e ↑ k ↓ λ ↓ x ↓
Pessimistic k ↑ e ↑ k ↑ λ ↑ x ↑ or k ↑ λ ↓ x ↓
2.6 Conclusion
The importance of quality control in two-sided markets has been acknowledged by
practitioners and researchers. In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of the role
played by a biased perception of uncertain supplier quality in the design of a platform
that coordinates the performance of two sides of the market. Our contribution centers
on how platform profit, buyer surplus, driver surplus, and social surplus are affected
by buyer’s sentiment that might range from pessimism to optimism.
We contribute to platform economics theory by modeling the decisions that ac-
count for the buyer’s preference over seller quality in two-sided markets. In particular,
we characterize the conditions wherein a platform firm would find it profitable to ex-
clude poor-quality sellers in the presence of buyers with a range of sentiment. To be
consistent with previous studies (Anderson et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2019; Zheng
and Kaiser, 2013), our base case model analysis first characterizes a trade-off be-
tween managing a buyer’s high quality expectation versus securing more sellers. This
trade-off shapes a platform firm’s exclusion threshold decision in a two-sided market
under the assumption of buyers with a neutral sentiment. We find that the exclusion
decision relies on the nature of services or products. For products or services, where
buyers’ preference over quality highly strengthens the cross-side network effects, the
exclusion may be effective in the regime, without a sentiment bias, where there are
enough potential sellers. Moreover, our base case results complement the findings of
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earlier studies (e.g. Anderson et al., 2014; Zheng and Kaiser, 2013) wherein a key de-
terminant of platform firms’ exclusion strategy is whether the market is quality-driven
or content-driven.
Previous studies on the behavior of buyers on the use of platforms (Hagiu and
Wright, 2015), together with the observations from our controlled experiments, have
motivated to consider the impact of buyer sentiment on the perception of quality. We
have explored how buyer’s sentiment may affect the optimal firm exclusion decisions.
For a given level of buyer sentiment, our analysis develops a series of design guidelines
in terms the selecting the exclusion threshold. The primary guideline is that tilting
the buyer sentiment towards optimism regarding anticipated quality affects platform
profitability. Moreover, we find that a platform firm can reduce or even eliminate the
exclusion threshold as buyers become more optimistic because the optimism ampli-
fies the cross-side network effect. In turn, a platform firm can make more profit with
more optimistic buyers and the profit can be even more enhanced if the exclusion
accurately accounts for the level of sentiment. Although optimism monotonically im-
pacts the firm profit in a positive way, it may harm the actual benefit of buyers. In
this regard, from a social welfare perspective, we show that a social planner chooses
to exclude more sellers for optimistic buyers and fewer sellers for pessimistic buyers.
This result provides policy guidance: the social welfare can be maximized with a
stabilized threshold that does not dynamically vary with buyer sentiment. We also
find that the exclusion decisions must be selected differently for new market entrants
whose buyers may update the sentiment based on the level of threshold, when com-
pared with the threshold selected by an incumbent firm. Due to limited information
about new entrants, the level of the threshold can signal how much effort the firms
make in managing the seller quality. With the updating behavior in a quality-driven
platform market, a lower threshold works better for a start-up firm with a lack of
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brand recognition whose buyers tend to be initially pessimistic, whereas a higher
threshold outperforms for an established firm entering the new market with buyers
whose perceptions are moderately optimistic.
Given the finding that both platform profit and social welfare increase by raising
the sentiment towards optimism, we analyze two strategies, effective advertising and
price discrimination, to exploit the sentiment. We show that the maximum level of
advertising in a way to enhance optimism can be effective if the buyer’s sentiment
is taken into account by the exclusion decision. In line with the findings of Karle
and Schumacher (2017), our findings also confirm that any type of advertising effort
may enhance the willingness-to-pay of pessimistic buyers as the exclusion strategy
can signal a high quality to those buyers. Furthermore, we find that, with the ex-
clusion accounting for the buyer sentiment, platform firms can extract surplus from
either quality-seeking buyers or price-seeking buyers through a price discriminating
strategy. However, in the presence of buyer sentiment, price discrimination for the
exclusive services may harm the cross-side network effect due to limited availability
with pessimistic expectations.
This analysis has also brought up certain limitations within our formulation. Our
model focuses on buyer behavior in reaction to the quality variation of sellers, which
assume to be exogenously assigned. It would also be interesting to study how buyer
behavior changes in the situation in which sellers may endogenously increase their
quality level. Endogenous relationships on the seller side, make the exclusion decision
challenging. In addition, there is also the possibility that competition in the two-sided
market may induce a change in buyer’s sentiment. Although we do not explicitly
consider platform competition in our analyses, we discuss how incumbent and entrant
firms should differently implement the exclusion strategy. In future work, it would
be interesting to explore a platform firm’s exclusion decision when both sellers and
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buyers are allowed to adopt multiple platforms at the same time. Finally, empirical
studies are a growing dimension of platform economics studies. Our formulation and
results on sentiments can be tested in controlled behavioral studies, both for building
theory and for implementing sentiment-based policies.
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Essay 3
Adventuring or Avoiding the Chase?
Relocation Biases on a Ride-sharing
Platform
3.1 Introduction
The success of ride-sharing business models relies heavily on the supply of driver part-
ners participating in its platform. Most ride-sharing platforms allow drivers to freely
choose when to work and where to go. In terms of participation, drivers’ behavior
directly impacts the demand-supply balance. A platform must design incentives for
these drivers to lock in their participation. Recent studies in economics have em-
pirically investigated driver’s choices and their earnings in aggregate (e.g., Chen and
Sheldon, 2016; Cook et al., 2018; Hall et al., 2019; Zoepf et al., 2018). However,
such research has not focused on operational level detail, e.g., how drivers attempt
to enhance their earnings by choosing where to go to pick up their next customer.
Many ride-sharing platforms provide drivers with information about the spatial
price distribution over a map of the area where demand surges are observed. Figure
3·1 shows examples of “heatmaps” that are available to drivers of Uber and Lyft.
Based on this type of information, drivers make relocation decisions when they are
idle. There are two types of relocation decisions: surge-chasing and surge-avoiding.
In this study, we consider the impact of this binary relocation choice on driver payoff.
Understanding such relationships can reduce inefficiencies associated with dynamic
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pricing across spatially distributed demand zones. Thus, the goals for this paper are
two-fold: (i) to identify the conditions under which drivers with this binary relocation
decision are rewarded, and (ii) to develop a classification scheme of contingent factors,
such as distance travelled, that might improve ride-sharing platform performance.
Understanding driver behaviors and payoffs at the operational level are also critical
issues from a welfare perspective, because this binary choice directly affects driver
welfare. That is, by identifying the meaningful features associated with driver’s pay-
off, we can assess policy implications for how to regulate surge pricing governing the
demand-supply matching mechanism. Furthermore, by comparing different method-
ologies to predict driver’s payoff, this study can also inform the mechanisms available
to a platform for incentive design.
(a) Lyft (b) Uber




A driver’s relocation strategies can be influenced by alternative behavioral mecha-
nisms. Consider the driver choice between the strategy of either surge-chasing or
surge-avoiding. First, many drivers may wish to maximize their profit while driving.
Locations of surge zones, and implied levels of high demand, are public information.
Profit-maximizing drivers may prefer to drive towards surge zones, which are likely to
provide better payoffs. The neoclassical economic theory supports a positive associa-
tion between worker’s earning and their profit-maximizing behavior (Oettinger, 1999).
In the context of ride-sharing platforms, Chen and Sheldon (2016) find a positive re-
lationship between a surge in price and a drivers’ working-hour decision. Similarly,
for the relocation decision, the surge-chasing from profit-maximizing behavior may
induce drivers to flock to the surge zones, and thus increase drivers’ likelihood of
picking up passengers for a higher price (Besbes et al., 2019; Ma et al., 2018).
Second, drivers may want to avoid negative feelings, such as regret, in a case where
they could have experienced better earnings from unchosen choices (Jiang et al., 2020;
Zeelenberg et al., 1996). Chaudhari et al. (2018) find that a driver’s surge-chasing
may be costly. Since the spatial distributions of supply and demand change over
time, not every chasing decision is expected to yield a positive payoff. To avoid such
a situation, regret-averse drivers may either stay in the current zone or relocate to
zones with a lower surge multiplier (both these choices are labelled as surge-avoiding).
However, to take advantage of a driver’s profit-maximizing behavior, a platform may
attempt to increase the number of matches by encouraging drivers to relocate to surge
zones with high demand through information sharing (Jiang et al., 2020). Therefore,
regret-averse drivers may not be rewarded as much as profit-maximizing drivers, and
rewards for chasing surge prices may align with the incentive mechanism set up by a
platform. Some drivers may also believe that surge-avoiding may result in increased
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relocation costs. Hence, we offer a comparative profit margin hypothesis for a driver
relocation’s choice as:
Hypothesis 3.1. Surge-chasing drivers have a higher profit margin than surge-avoiding
drivers.
Predicting whether each relocation behavior is rewarded, and the conditions as-
sociated with these predictions, are useful in understanding the relationship between
driver behavior and the payoff choices set up by a platform as a part of its incentive
system. Hence, our second hypothesis is about predicting driver’s earnings in the ride-
sharing platform. Studies on machine learning have found that classification with the
radial basis kernel outperform linear kernels in a high dimensional space (e.g., Kav-
zoglu and Colkesen, 2009). In line with machine learning literature, the outcomes for
spatial and temporal dimensions of decisions, their interaction, the need not be linear.
Consequently, driver behaviors are not likely to exhibit linearly separable attributes.
Therefore, we hypothesize that the prediction from a radial support vector machine
(SVM) outperforms linear models such as logistic regression and linear SVM:
Hypothesis 3.2. With multiple consideration affecting driver behavior, profit pre-
diction using SVM with the radial basis kernel outperforms predictions either with
logistic regression or linear SVM.
3.3 Data and Analysis
3.3.1 Data and Feature Selection
In order to set up hypotheses testing, we extend the analysis of our dataset that has
been described in Chapter 1. However, unlike the approach taken in Chapter 1, the
unit of analysis in this chapter is each driver’s relocation bias. We focus on drivers
who provide UberX services in the city of San Francisco, from the time they appear in
the system until the time they disappear by picking up passengers. Uber records idle
drivers’ locations. From this data set, we also gather surge multiplier data, over time,
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in each census block group, so we are able to link driver’s location with corresponding
surge multiplier. The observation period for collecting these data was from 12/2/2016
to 12/11/2016, and the total number of observations after data cleaning is 15,659.1
Figure 3·2: Description of relocation strategies
Since we know the location and surge multiplier available to each driver during
their idle time, we operationalize a driver’s relocation strategies as described in Figure
3·2. In this figure, t0 denotes the time each driver appeared, and t1 is when this driver
picked up a passenger group. If one’s location at t1 differs from the location at t0, the
driver’s behavior is considered as relocation. Among those relocating drivers, if the
surge multiplier in a destination is greater than the one in origin at t0 (i.e., Surgeot0 <
Surgedt0), we regard the relocation as surge-chasing. In contrast, surge-avoiding
drivers relocate from the origin with higher surge multiplier to the destination with
lower surge multiplier (i.e., Surgeot0 > Surgedt0). We also assume a driver is surge-
avoiding if the relocation happens for the same surge multiplier (i.e., Surgeot0 =
1We attempted to exclude extreme situations. We excluded drivers whose idle time was less
than 1 minute because we can assume that 1 minute was too short of making a relocation decision.
Furthermore, we excluded drivers who were idle more than 60 minutes, as the situation is the other
extreme.
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Surgedt0). Because of this, the driver incurs a relocation cost. Furthermore, we also
regard a staying driver whose location is the same for both t0 and t1 as a surge-
avoiding driver.
We label each driver’s earning (yi) as a binary value: 1 for the rewarded drivers
and 0 for the non-rewarded. We compare the surge multipliers of origin and des-
tination at t1 to see whether a driver is rewarded or not. Drivers are rewarded if
Surgeot1 < Surgedt1 , whereas those with Surgeot1 > Surgedt1 are not rewarded.
When Surgeot1 = Surgedt1 after relocation, the drivers are not rewarded due to the
relocation costs. On the other hand, staying drivers with Surgeot1 = Surgedt1 are
assumed to be rewarded if their idle time is less than 3 minutes.2
The feature set of each driver (xi) is selected based on the previous studies about
driver’s earnings. In addition to the relocation strategies, the likelihood of matching
may have an impact on the driver’s earnings. As the likelihood increases, a driver’s
earnings may increase. The likelihood may decrease in the number of drivers, who
seek passengers in the same zone, since more drivers induce competition for a given
amount of demand (Casadesus-Masanell and Ha laburda, 2014). The price at origin
and destination may also decrease the likelihood of matching because rider demand
also falls with the increase of price (Hall et al., 2019). Moreover, the relocation costs
may have an impact on the driver’s earning (Jiang et al., 2020). In our analysis, we use
distance to destination and time to destination as the proxies for the relocation costs.
Table 3.1 summarizes our feature set that may determine a driver’s dichotomous
reward level.
2The average relocation time of drivers from one to another zone is about 3 minutes for the
sample.
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Table 3.1: List of Features
Feature Reference
Relocation strategies Chaudhari et al. (2018),
(Chasing, Avoiding) Jiang et al. (2019)
Price difference (PriceDiff) Hall et al. (2019)
The number of drivers at origin Casadesus-Masanell
(Supply) and Ha laburda (2014)
Price at origin (Price) Hall et al. (2019)
Distance to destination (TravelDist) Jiang et al. (2019)
Time to destination (TravelT ime) Jiang et al. (2019)
3.3.2 Logistic Regression with Lasso Regularization
In our analysis, logistic regression with lasso regularization is applied to test our hy-
potheses while classifying which drivers are rewarded. The ordinary logistic regression
model is specified as follows:




where xi is the vector of the feature set for driver i and β is the vector of the regression
coefficients. By including the selected feature set, the regression specification that we
analyze is:
ln(Earning) =β0 + β1Chasing + β2Price+ β3Supply (3.2)
+ β4DiffP rice+ β5TravelDist+ β6TravelT ime
Generally speaking, the maximum likelihood of the logistic regression estimates may
vary in the case when the features are highly correlated or the number of features
is large. The lasso is a model-driven approach that deals well with the issues of
multicollinearity and overfitting by penalizing parameters (e.g., Bastani and Bayati,
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2020; Pereira et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2018). The log-likelihood function of the








where λ is a tuning parameter which can be determined separately using k-fold cross-
validation and p is the number of features.
The logistic lasso regression estimator relies on the choice of λ ≥ 0. As λ increases,
more features are included in the estimation process (Hastie et al., 2004). The mini-
mum value of λ would result in the most accurate set of coefficients but more likely to
face the overfitting issue. We use λ within one standard error from the minimum to
account for the trade-off. Our estimation follows the procedure of “glmnet” package
on R software, and we obtain the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval (500 runs)
for each feature. Table 3.2 documents the results.
Table 3.2: Estimated Coefficients and Confidence Intervals
Coefficient (βj) Bootstrapped 95% Confidence Interval
(Intercept) -10.26* (-14.34, -4.50 )
Chasing 17.76* (10.91, 22.27 )
Price 0.00 (-0.157, 0.078 )
Supply 0.00 (-0.002, 0.002 )
PriceDiff 0.00 (-0.338, 0.373 )
TravelDist -3.14* (-3.849, -2.173 )
TravelT ime -0.02* (-0.027, -0.015 )
Notes. For the regularization, λ within one standard error from the minimum, obtained
from the k-fold cross validation, was used.
To test our first hypothesis, we assess the coefficients of the categorical variable
for the surge-chasing group (Chasing), since the reference group is the surge-avoiding
group. If the confidence interval for the estimate does not contain a zero, then the
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coefficient is significantly different from zero. Table 3.2 shows a positive and signifi-
cant relationship between Chasing and Earning (β1 = 17.76, 95% CI: 10.91, 22.27),
supporting the assertion that surge-chasing behavior is more likely to induce higher
profit margin than staying does. This result supports our Hypothesis 3.1: surge-
chasing drivers have a higher profit margin than surge-avoiding drivers.
In addition, we find that the coefficients for TravelDist (β5 = −3.14, 95% CI:
−3.849,−2.173) and TravelT ime (β6 = −0.02, 95% CI: −0.027,−0.015) are nega-
tive and significant, and the coefficients of Price, Supply, and PriceDiff are not
significant. That is, the distance and time to the destination from an origin de-
crease the likelihood of a driver getting a positive profit margin. No matter which
strategy a driver takes, the driver’s profit margin relies on how far to drive and how
long it takes to arrive. This result implies that even surge-chasing strategy can be a
non-profit-maximizing behavior if the driver chases too-far surge in a busy period.
3.3.3 Comparison with Support Vector Machine
As mentioned, it is important to address how a platform firm may predict a driver’s
earnings to set up an effective incentive system. In this section, we compare the
performance of three classification models that are commonly used: Logistic lasso
regression, SVM with linear kernel, and SVM with radial basis kernel. First, we
assess Type I and II errors, which are defined as follows:
• Type 1 error: predict as non-rewarding when it was actually rewarding,
• Type 2 error: predicted as rewarding when it was actually non-rewarding.
In addition, we evaluate whether each model is biased to favor Type I or Type II
errors by calculating prediction bias given by Type I error−Type II error
2
. When the bias
parameter gets is closer to 0, the model deemed to balance potentially incorrect
classifications. We subset the entire data with each relocation strategy and use 45%
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Table 3.3: Type I and Type II Errors from Different Models
Type I Type II Total error Prediction bias
Lasso regression
Chasing 45.65% 1.07% 46.74% 22.28%
Avoiding 1.19% 0% 1.19% 0.59%
Overall 0.82% 0.17% 0.99% 0.33%
Linear SVM
Chasing 14.13% 18.47% 32.61% -2.17%
Avoiding 0.41% 1.03% 1.44% -0.31%
Overall 0.59% 2.94% 3.53% -1.17%
Radial SVM
Chasing 15.22% 18.48% 33.70% -1.63%
Avoiding 0.60% 0.60% 1.20% 0.00%
Overall 0.88% 0.89% 1.77% 0.00%
of the subset as the training set. The results are shown in Table 3.3. Furthermore,
we examine the mean squared error of each model by conducting the k-fold cross-
validation, which helps us find the best model. Table 3.4 documents the errors for
each model.














From Table 3.3, Type I and Type II errors show mixed results. The linear SVM
yields the least total errors for the surge-chasing group (32.61%), while the lasso re-
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gression produces the least total errors for the surge-avoiding group (1.19%) and for
the entire set (0.99%). There is no one single model that outperforms the others in
generating the least incorrect predictions. Despite the mixed results, the radial SVM
generates the least prediction bias for any test set. As mentioned, the less bias a
model has, the more incorrect classifications are balanced within the model. These
results indicate that the radial SVM may provide the most robust classifier, with the
lowest level of bias amongst our prediction options. Moreover, the mean squared er-
rors from the k-fold cross-validation, as documented in Table 3.4, support the model
performance with the radial SVM kernel in the presence of multiple relocation behav-
iors. Although the mean squared errors of the radial SVM are higher for individual
relocation strategies than the linear SVM, the radial SVM performs the best (1.70%)
when it is applied to the entire validation set with the relocation as a categorical
feature. Therefore, our Hypothesis 3.2 is supported.
3.4 Conclusions and Managerial Implication
As ride-sharing platforms have grown, they have played a critical role in setting up the
labor market for gig-economy positions. Although many platforms regard drivers as
freelancers who have independent autonomy, these drivers often demand various types
of employee benefits, because many of them serve as full-time drivers. In response
to such claims, platforms attempt to provide benefits such as health insurance. 3 In
the absence of such benefits, reward gained from rides become crucial determinants
of driver welfare.
Moreover, at an operational level, rewards that drivers earn based on their reloca-
tion decisions are directly linked with their welfare. Our results provide two insights




avoiding choices may face lower profit margins than drivers who chase the surge.
The other is that relocating too far in rush hours can be costly. A social planner
who is concerned about driver welfare may encourage drivers to chase near-surges. A
far-surge may incur high relocation costs. Therefore, from the social welfare perspec-
tive, the social planner may regulate the platform to adopt a certain degree of price
smoothing. In addition, driver welfare can be enhanced by providing an assignment
priority to surge-avoiding drivers.
From a platform firm’s perspective, our results provide insights on how to design
a better incentive system that can be customized to account for the variability in
driver behavior. Our results show that SVM with the radial basis function performs
with the smallest classification error, irrespective of whether a driver has a positive
profit margin or not. By accurately predicting the payoff from relocation decisions, a
platform can adjust the spatial distribution of surge multiplier in ways to reward as
many drivers as possible, which will help the platform firm improve its service.
Epilogue
This dissertation examines how a platform’s governance choices should be designed to
enhance system performance while accounting for stakeholder, supplier, and consumer
behaviors. Given the data-rich environments that modern platforms operate in, our
work applies multiple data-analytic techniques, while delving into each stakeholder’s
(i.e., the seller, buyer, and platform firm) decisions in the context of ride-sharing
platforms. This dissertation has three constituent essays. Each essay accounts for
the decisions of a platform and its sellers and buyers in an integrative manner. Col-
lectively, they provide guidance on how platform governance policies such as quality
control and pricing may impact platform performance, labor surplus, consumer sur-
plus, and social welfare. This work sets up methodological and theory contributions
to invite follow on research and industry applications that helps all the stakeholders
in a two-sided platform domain to fully leverage their capabilities.
The first and third essays focus on the decisions of a platform firm and its sellers
while accounting for the spatial distribution of demand. A key question examined in
the first essay is how a ride-sharing platform should design its price structure options,
such as spatial price smoothing, to manage the spatial spillovers of demand and
supply. Our results show that Uber balances price smoothing and capacity spillover
effects. Spatial pricing outperforms a spot pricing policy. An allied counterfactual
analysis shows that welfare can be improved by spillover-based pricing and capacity
decisions. In addition to the examination of a platform’s pricing choices in the third
essay, we explore the conditions wherein a driver’s relocation behavior is rewarded.
We find that a driver’s surge-chasing behavior may increase the platform’s profit
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margin so long as the surge destination is not too far, and it does not take too long
to arrive.
The second essay explores the optimality of a platform’s decision on excluding
poor quality sellers while accounting for buyer’s sentiment bias in anticipating seller
quality. A key finding in this essay is that buyer’s level of optimism is positively
associated with a platform’s profitability. Moreover, social welfare can be maximized
with a stabilized threshold that does not vary with buyer sentiment dynamically. Our
results also provide assessments on how a platform firm can invest in advertising and
set up price discrimination strategies to leverage buyer optimism.
Results from these three essays open up potential avenues for future research. For
instance, our current formulation aggregates the behavior of consumers and suppliers.
How might a platform nudge individual consumer behavior, through personalization
features that may be bundled into platform design? Since our results indicate that
pricing policies and quality controls interrelate with seller and buyer behavior, under-
standing the impact of personalization on behavioral changes under different gover-
nance policies is critical to enhancing system performance. Another result, from the
third essay, indicates that profit can be accurately predicted using SVM with a radial
basis kernel when there are multiple factors affecting supply-side choices under the
spatial distribution of demand. This sets up methodological possibilities on how fu-
ture analytical and experimental work for spatial assessment of platform performance
could be designed.
Finally, these findings raise questions regarding how to reduce the design gap be-
tween a profit-maximizer and a welfare-maximizer stakeholder under spatial demand
distribution and behavioral biases. Our results suggest that a governance policy that
maximizes firm profit may not be optimal from a social planner’s perspective. Explo-
ration of ways to minimize this gap will help platform economics literature to offer
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more robust designs and operating strategies.
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Appendix A
Proof of Equilibrium Price of Uber
The surge multiplier does not decrease below 1 even in case of low utilization, but
only increases up to smax in the case of congestion (1 ≥ si,t ≥ smax). Therefore, we
are only interested in the equilibrium when the demand state is greater than or equal
to the current focal capacity (i.e. E[di,t | si,t = 1] ≥ FCi,t). Hence, we can simplify
the cost function Vi,t(FCi,t) as follows:
Vi,t(FCi,t) = E[p ·max(0, di,t−FCi,t)+h ·FCi,t+1] = p ·(E[di,t]−FCi,t)+h ·E[FCi,t+1]
Then, the first order condition (FOC) is:
∂Vi,t(FCi,t)
∂si,t
= p · ∂E[di,t]
∂si,t
+ h · ∂FCi,t+1
∂si,t
= 0
(i) If the endogenous demand is still greater than the focal capacity with any price
s∗i,t (i.e. di,t(s
∗
i,t) ≥ FCi,t), then s∗i,t = smax
(ii) However, if the demand becomes lower than the focal capacity with a certain
price s∗i,t (i.e. di,t(s
∗
i,t) < FCi,t), then the FOC is:
−pα+h((FCi,t +α · s∗i,t− θi,t) ·γFC +α(γFC · s∗i,t + δFC) +NCi,t ·γNC +UCt ·γUC) = 0
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s∗i,t =


















Description of Uber Data
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics
Summary Statistics Correlation
Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev si,t FCi,t NCi,t UCt
si,t 1.0000 3.3702 1.0467 0.1458 1 -0.08 -0.13 0.21
FCi,t 0.00 615.00 30.74 41.41 1 0.65 -0.37
NCi,t 0.00 155.00 31.63 25.24 1 -0.64
UCt 0.00 12714.00 7426.02 2660.31 1
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Figure B·1: Multiple Observation Points and Average Focal Capacity
Level
Reproduced from Jiang et al. (2018)
Figure B·2: Travel Time from One Zone to Another Zone
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Figure B·3: Example of Trend of Total Drivers
Appendix C
Robustness Checks for Chapter 1
C.1 Robustness Check with Different Time-intervals
Table C.1: Relationship between capacity levels and surge multiplier
with different time intervals
Dependent Variable: Surge Multiplier
15-minute Interval 60-minute Interval
(N = 313,212) (N = 78,432)
Spatial Dependency 0.90** 0.87**
(0.012) (0.015)
Focal Capacity 6.52× 10−6 2.82× 10−5
(8.32× 10−5) (3.05× 10−5)
Neighbor Capacity −8.80× 10−4** −3.10× 10−4**
(1.82× 10−4) (1.41× 10−4 )
Untapped Capacity −3.49× 10−6** −1.18× 10−6**
(1.35× 10−6) (4.08× 10−7 )
Controls included included
Log-likelihood 144053.10 38599.65
Notes. Controls include Hourt, Weekendt, and Weathert . Robust standard errors clustered by zone are in
parentheses.
+p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
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C.2 Robustness Check with Different W s
Table C.2: Relationship between capacity levels and surge multiplier
with different spatial weight matrices (Fixed Effect)
Dependent Variable: Surge Multiplier
W1 W2 W3
(N = 156,692) (N = 156,692) (N = 156,692)
Spatial Dependency 0.89** 0.85** 0.87**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Focal Capacity 1.22× 10−5 8.27× 10−5 1.11× 10−4 +
(4.99× 10−5) (5.32× 10−5 ) (5.68× 10−5 )
Neighbor Capacity −4.96× 10−4** −3.85× 10−4** −6.84× 10−4**
(1.03× 10−4) (7.41× 10−5 ) (1.08× 10−4 )
Untapped Capacity −1.89× 10−6* −4.90× 10−7 −2.42× 10−6**
(7.31× 10−7) (6.16× 10−7 ) (7.32× 10−7 )
Controls included included included
Log-likelihood 75369.06 77648.74 75132.59
Notes. Controls include Hourt, Weekendt, and Weathert . Robust standard errors clustered by zone are in
parentheses.
+p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.3: Relationship between capacity levels and surge multiplier
with different spatial weight matrices (Random Effect)
Dependent Variable: Surge Multiplier
W1 W2 W3
(N = 156,692) (N = 156,692) (N = 156,692)
Spatial Dependency 0.89** 0.85** 0.87**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Focal Capacity 1.06× 10−5 8.39× 10−5 1.10× 10−4 +
(4.82× 10−5) (5.15× 10−5 ) (5.52× 10−5 )
Neighbor Capacity −4.72× 10−4** −3.76× 10−4** −6.65× 10−4**
(1.00× 10−4 ) (7.18× 10−5 ) (1.04× 10−4 )
Untapped Capacity −1.75× 10−6* −4.30× 10−7 −2.31× 10−6**
(7.18× 10−7 ) (6.07× 10−7 ) (7.16× 10−7 )
Controls included included included
Log-likelihood 74919.32 77199.68 74678.40
Notes. Controls include Hourt, Weekendt, and Weathert . Robust standard errors clustered by zone are in
parentheses. +p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
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C.3 Robustness Check with IVs
Table C.4: GMM approach with FCi,t−8 as IV





Focal Capacity −2.14× 10−5**
(3.05× 10−5)
Neighbor Capacity −7.22× 10−5**
(1.36× 10−5 )
Untapped Capacity −3.67× 10−7**
(3.29× 10−8 )
Controls included
Notes. Controls include Hourt, Weekendt, and Weathert . Robust standard errors clustered by zone are in
parentheses.
+p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ p < 0.01.
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C.4 Demand Sensitivity
(Aggregate price sensitivity of demand α set at 50)
Figure C·1: Average Capacity Shortage (Less is Better)
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Figure C·2: Average Utilization (More is Better)
Figure C·3: Consumer Surplus
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Figure C·4: Labor Surplus
Appendix D
Behavioral Experiment
D.1 Design of Experiment
We conducted the randomized experiment under the IRB approval to demonstrate
how buyers perception about seller quality on a two-sided platform. In the experi-
ment, we introduce a generic ride-sharing platform and asked the subjects how they
expect the seller quality and whether they would join the platform with given sce-
nario. We recruited 61 subjects from Amazon Mechanical Turk and randomize the
subjects. Half of them were given with full information about the quality and the
other half received only range information about the quality (i.e., the highest possible
quality and the lowest possible quality). The subjects answer 30 times for different
sets of information, which are classified into regular waiting-time and longer waiting-
time to see how different the subjects’ decisions are in the situation where seller are
scarce. The randomization process and outcomes were described in Figure D·1.
The experiment consists of two phases. In phase one, we asked the follwing ques-
tions to control the subjects’ intrinsic values:
1. Which of the following best describes your age group?
2. Which of the following best describes your experience of any of app-based ride-
sharing services (e.g., Uber, Lyft)?




Figure D·1: Randomization process and outcome
4. How much would you prefer taking a ride-sharing service (e.g., Uber, Lyft) to
other transportation options including Taxi, Bus, Subway, Limo, Shuttle, etc.?
5. Imagine you are using a ride-sharing service. In that platform, drivers are rated
using a 7-star scale (1 being the worst; 7 being the best). The following example
shows a driver’s current rating and a sample of comments that the driver has
received. Based on the provided historical rating and comments, how would
you rate the driver/car quality in the following dimensions? How would you
rate the overall quality?
In phase two, we provided a specific scenario about time, location, average price,
average waiting-time, and average service-time. The interface that a subject faced is
shown in Figure D·2. With the scenario, subjects answered the following questions:
(1) Based on the given information, please guess the current rating of the driver who
will pick you up. (i.e., how much-rated driver will pick you up?) (2) How likely would
you be to take this ride?
110
Figure D·2: Screenshot of the experiment
Appendix E
Proofs of Chapter 2
E.1 Lemma 1
Since the profit function in Equation (2.5) relies on the values of m(k, p) and n(k, p),
the optimization problem should be solved for two cases:
Seller shortage (congestion)
The condition for congestion is m(k, p) ≥ n(k, p). For uniformly distributed seller
quality q and buyer’s marginal benefit from an additional seller v, Prob.(q > k) =
(1 − k) and q(k) = 1+k
2
. By replacing these in Equation (2.2) and (2.4), we get






. By restricting the inequality
m(k, p) ≥ n(k, p) for 0 ≤ k < 1, 0 ≤ θ < 1,p ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, r ≥ 0, N ≥ 0, and
M ≥ 0, we get the following inequalities:
M




0 ≤ p ≤





(E.1) turns to m(k, 0) > n(k, 0) and 0 ≤ p < n(k,0)(m(k,0)−n(k,0))V
M
. With this condition,
the profit function becomes n(k, p)pr = N(1− k)pr, which is linear to both p and k.
Hence, the boundary conditions for the non-zero equilibrium (k = 0 and m(k, p)p(1−
r) = c) provides the optimal solutions in (2.6).
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Buyer shortage (no congestion)
m(k, p) ≤ n(k, p) must be satisfied to have no congestion. From the inequality, we get
the following conditions: m(k, 0) > n(k, 0) and p > n(k,0)(m(k,0)−n(k,0))V
M
or m(k, 0) ≤


































BM) < 0, and (c) det(H) > 0. Besides, the condition for non-zero
equilibrium also must hold. These combined conditions imply:
β − 2V ≥ 0,




When (E.3) does not hold, the boundary conditions need to be compared. Since
n(k, p) is always zero when k = 1, we have ΠP (k = 0) ≥ ΠP (k = 1). Hence k∗BM = 0





N(2V + β). In sum, we obtain the optimal




When β > 2V and m(k, 0) > n(k, 0) and p ≥ n(k,p)(m(k,0)−n(k,p))
M
V , or m(k, 0) ≤
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9β2




























































= −2MNr(β − 2V )(β + V )
2
27βV 2








2MNr(2β − V )(β + V )2
27β2V
> 0 for β > 2V.

E.3 Proposition 2
From Lemma 2.1, we know that having k makes sense only in the normal regime with
more sellers than buyers. In other words, m(k, p) ≤ n(k, p) must be satisfied.
In the existence of buyer’s optimism bias θ, the expected quality q(k) becomes




and n(k, p) is N(1− k).
By restricting the inequality m(k, p) ≤ n(k, p) for 0 ≤ k < 1, 0 ≤ θ < 1,p ≥ 0,
β ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, r ≥ 0, N ≥ 0, and M ≥ 0, we get the following conditions: m(k, 0) >
n(k, 0) and p > n(k,0)(m(k,0)−n(k,0))V
M
or m(k, 0) ≤ n(k, 0). Under the condition, the
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= 0. By solving the first























θ) < 0, and (c) det(H) > 0. Besides, the condition for non-zero equi-
librium also must hold. These combined conditions imply: β(2 − 3θ) − V ≥ 0
and c ≤ MN(1−r)(V+β)
3
27V β(1−θ) . When these conditions do not hold, k
∗




N(V + βθ). Hence, we obtain the optimal solution as (2.9).

E.4 Proposition 3
When buyer’s expected quality is q(k) = θ + (1− θ)k,














27V β(1−θ) . The





BM)− ΠP (k∗θ , p∗θ) =
(1− 2θ)2MNr(β + V )3
27β(1− θ)V
. (E.5)
For 0 ≤ θ ≤ 2β−V
3β




for β > 0 and V > 0.
Hence, equation (E.5) is always greater than or equal to 0.





| = θ − 1
2
. Let x be θ − 1
2












By arranging the inequality θ ≤ 2β−V
3β




. For β > 0 and V > 0,
x ≤ 1
6
. Hence, the right hand side of equation (E.6) is always greater than 0.







− θ. Let y be 1
2










16MNr(1 + y)x(β + V )3
27βV (1 + 2y)2
(E.7)
the right hand side of equation (E.7) is always greater than 0. Therefore, we can
conclude that |ΠP (k∗θ , p∗θ)− ΠP (k∗BM , p∗BM)| increases in |θ − 12 |. 
E.5 Proposition 2.4








πS dq + ΠP , (E.8)
where v∗ is v that makes πB = (v + βq(k))N(1 − k) − p = 0. Then we have v∗ =
p






















= (−(k−1)N(β(θ−θk+k)+V )−p)(V ((k−1)N(β+βθ(k−1)+V )+p)−2Mp)
2(k−1)NV . (E.9)








that satisfy the F.O.C and the S.O.C are:
k∗SW =
2M(β(3θ − 2) + V ) + 3β(1− 2θ)V
3β(2(θ − 1)M − 2θV + V )
,
p∗SW = −
2MN(β + V )2 (4(θ − 1)M2 + 4(2− 3θ)MV + 3(2θ − 1)V 2)
9β(2M − V )(2(θ − 1)M − 2θV + V )2
. (E.10)
Now we compare the welfare-maximizing threshold k∗SW from Equation (E.10) with
the profit-maximizing threshold k∗θ from Equation (2.9). By restricting the inequality
k∗SW ≥ k∗θ for V ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, and M ≥ 0, we obtain
(2θ − 1)V (β + V )
−β(1− θ)(−2(1− θ)M − (2θ − 1)V )
≥ 0.
If θ satisfies 2θ− 1 ≥ 0, then −2(1− θ)M − (2θ− 1)V < 0 is also satisfied for M ≥ 0
and V ≥ 0. Therefore, for θ ≥ 1
2
, the inequality k∗SW ≥ k∗θ is always satisfied.
In contrast, the condition for k∗SW ≤ k∗θ is
(2θ − 1)V (β + V )
−β(1− θ)(−2(1− θ)M − (2θ − 1)V )
≤ 0.
To satisfy both θ ≤ 1
2
and−2(1−θ)M−(2θ−1)V < 0, M needs to satisfyM > (2θ−1)V
2(θ−1) .
Hence, we can conclude that if M > (2θ−1)V
2(θ−1) and 0 ≤ θ ≤
1
2
, then the inequality
k∗SW ≤ k∗θ is satisfied.

E.6 Proposition 2.5










(3βθ20(9(a− 1)β + T ) + βθ0((a(27a− 14) + 27)β + 6aT + 40aV − 6T )+




β(9βθ0(2a+ θ0 − 2) + (a(9a+ 2) + 9)β + 20aV ). From the non-
negative condition of k, i.e., 0 ≤ k∗θ′ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ k∗θ0 ≤ 1, we have V > 2β and
0 ≤ θ0 ≤ 2β−V3β . Within this range, by solving the inequality k
∗
θ′ ≤ k∗θ0 , we gain
0 ≤ θ0 ≤ 4β−5V9β and β >
5V
4






< θ0 ≤ 2β−V3β and β >
5V
4
, or 0 ≤ θ0 ≤ 2β−V3β and
V
2
< β < 5V
4
.








M(β + V )
3V
. (E.11)







25aV (3aβ + 3βθ0 − 3β + Y )
(E.12)
(9a3β2 + 13a2β2 + 40a2βV + βθ0(27a
2β − 14aβ + 40aV + 6aX + 27β − 6X)
+ 3a2βX − 13aβ2 − 40aβV + 10aV X + 4aβX + 3βθ20(9(a− 1)β + Y ) + 9β2θ30 − 9β2 + 3βX). (E.13)
where X =
√





9a2β + 18(a− 1)βθ0 + 2aβ + 20aV + 9βθ20 + 9β
)
.
By comparing (E.11) with (E.13), we have m(k∗θ′ , p
∗
θ′) ≥ m(k∗θ0 , p
∗
θ0
) for all M ≥ 0,







, then k∗θ0 = k
∗






N(V + βθ0). Hence,





, p∗θ0) for the highly optimistic buyers.

E.7 Proposition 2.6
In the existence of advertising effort, the optimal k and p that satisfy the F.O.C. and













N(βθ − βeθ + βe+ V ) otherwise.
(E.15)
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2 for k∗e > 0,
MNr(β(e(−θ)+e+θ)+V )2−4Ae2V
4V
for k∗e = 0.
(E.16)











− 2A for k∗e = 0.
(E.17)
The conditions for concavity are A ≥ β
2(θ−1)2MNr
4V
for k∗e = 0 and A ≥
2MNr(β+V )3
54β(e−1)3(θ−1)V
for k∗e > 0.

E.8 Proposition 2.7
First, we analyze the situation where nh ≥ nl, i.e., λ = 1+2k3 . Assuming the price and









(9V + 7βθ) if k∗θ = 0
, (E.18)
vH =
 118(V (4 + 9x) + (−14 + 9x)β) if k∗θ > 01
12
(9V x+ β(−4 + (−8 + 9x)θ)) if k∗θ = 0
. (E.19)




5βθ−3β−13θV+15V18−18θ if k∗θ > 01
12
(βθ + 9V ) if k∗θ = 0
, (E.20)
vH =
19(9V x+ V + β(9x− 8)) if k∗θ > 01
6
(9V x+ β(θ(9x− 2)− 4)) if k∗θ = 0
. (E.21)
For x > 1, these values must be less than V in order for buyers to join for either
type of sellers. For example, there exist buyers who can join for high type sellers only
if vH < V . By comparing all values of vH and vL in equation (E.18), (E.19), (E.20),
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and (E.21) with V for x > 1, β ≥ 0, V ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, we obtain the following:
vL in equation (E.18) > V for both cases;
vH in equation (E.19) < V if 1 < x < 14
9
and k∗θ > 0;
vH in equation (E.19) < V if 1 < x < 12V+4β+8βθ
9V+9βθ
and k∗θ = 0;
vL in equation (E.20 < V if 0 ≤ θ < 3
5




vL in equation (E.20 < V if (0 ≤ θ ≤ 3
5
and 0 < β < V
2−3θ ) or (
3
5
< θ < 1 and
0 < β < 3V
θ
) for k∗θ = 0;
vH in equation (E.21) > V for both cases;
Therefore, we conclude that there are no low type buyers when λ = 1+2k
3
and no





The platform profit function with segmentation is:
ΠP = ml(k, p)pr +mh(k, xp)xpr (E.22)
From Proposition 2.7, when nh > nl, there are no low type buyers. As long as
vH < V ,





By plugging k∗θ and p
∗
θ in k and p as in equation (2.9), we obtain the profit function
as equation (2.13).
Similarly, when nh < nl, there are no high type buyers. Thus, if v
L < V ,





By plugging k∗θ and p
∗
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